The gamecock. (Columbia, S.C.) 1908-2006, February 06, 1975, Page Page 11, Image 12
At open letter to
' Public
BY PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK
Having accepted a $300,000
advance royalty for his for
thcoming memoirs, former Nixon
aide John Dean, for a modest fee of
$4,000, delivered a lectu'e recently
at the University of Virginia in
which he talked about the moral
implications of Watergate and the
evil attraction of power, to which
he said he was drawn "like a mota
to a candle, and badly burnt."
Five years ago this spectacle
would have been denounced as
"obscene." A few days previously
the faculty and student body at
Boston University voted not to pay
former White House press officer,
Ronald Zeigler, a similar fee for
lecturing in Boston. The invitation
to speak was not cancelled, but
after the fee was withdrawn,
Zeigler failed to show.
A political scientist at Boston
University raised the moral issue
involved in such cases put bluntly
as the rhetorical question: "Why
should the University encourage
crime by paying outrageous fees to
alleged malefactors or inveterate
liars, simply because they were
inevitably involved in Watergate
as members of Nixon's White
House staff?"
This situation has not yet arisen
at the University of South Carolina,
but if it does, news media reports
on the John Dean lecture indicate
that he is unlikely to establish
himself as either a perceptive
moralist or political scientist. The
reader may recall that on April 30,
1973, in an agonized address to the
American people former President
Richard M. Nixon also raised the
question, "How is it that men of
unimpeachable qualifications and
personal integrity get enmeshed in
such sordid undertakings as
Watergate?" Following Nixon's
address I wrote an article for The
Baltimore San (May 20, 1973) from
which the following is adapted.
I suggested that the answer to
this question lies in the so-called
corporate ethic which develops in
the subculture of power--the
cluster of technical, military or
political experts-which surrounds
the president and to whom he must
turn for advice. In this ethic, the
principle that the end justifies the
means is unconsciously trans
formed into a mixture of cor
porate loyalty and "the good of'the
cause," and thus becomes ac
ceptable to otherwise honorable
men whom in their private lives
would never sink to the level of the
common thief or employ his
methods.
The subculture 'of power which
developes around the president, or
for that matter around the chief
e'xecutives of any of our great
corporations, is inescapable in the
modern world. Rational decision
making in either government or
big business must be based on
expert knowledge. But the
technotronic age in which we live is
so complex that it Is impossible for
The writer is a professor in
USC's Department of Government
and International Studies and has
written guest columns for this
newsapner in the past.
The Gamecock
morality
any executive to have a grasp of
more than one or two fields. Hence
the policymaker must rely on the
specialized knowledge and ex
perience of experts for both in
formation and advice. There is a
continuous interchange of such
experts between government and
the military-industrical-academic
complex.
Because of the bureaucratic
nature -of the modern,
technological state, the over
whelming majority of men who
move into government advisory
staffs are organization men, with
all that is implied in the term.
They are for the most part
careerists who have climbed up the
ladder of promotion in either a
corporate or government
bureaucracy to a level high enough
to attract presidential attention.
This institutionalized career
background has important effects
on how the individual functions
later as a White House staff or
Cabinet adviser.
The subculture of p
around the
is inescapable in i
The "organization man," par
excellence, is one who rises to the
top of a bureaucratic pyramid by
never backing a subordinate, by
never bucking a superior and by
keeping his mouth shut on the
moral issues which are often in
volved in decision-making at the
highest levels of both private en
terprise and the government.
These are the "big time
operators" who move into the new
echelon of supergrade positions
created with each change of ad
ministration. They may come
from either private or public life,
but are nearly always drawn from
big bureaucracies or from the
interlocking directorates at the top
of the corporate structure.
The qualifications of political
appointees to . cabinet or am
bassadorial posts may be largely
presumptuous. They may have
"met a payroll," a favorite
criterion of Eisenhower, under
whom Nixon served as vice
president, or they may have made
a generous contribution to the
campaign chest in an election
year.
The expertise of scientific and
technical advisers Is much more
likely to be genuine, as Is that of
the specialists in the use of
violence, the generals and flag
officers who move Into military
advisory positions. As an In
dividual the organization man
frequently exhibits the social
virtues implicit In the Dale Car
negie model. He Is often charming,
well-eduscated and to the manner
born, evoking Abram Tertz's
characterization of his Soviet
counterpart In The Trial Begins:
"He liked these people; they were
colleagues, everyone with a face
like an open book, a past as clear
as glass, and a stainless con
science. Kindly men of whom
and the s'
perhaps half the world was
terrified."
Whatever his career pattern or
specialized competence, the expert
in government usually possesses
no power of his own except as it is
delegated by the chief executive.
The heady intoxication of power
which John Dean, John Ehrlich
man Bob Haldeman and other
White House staffers enjoyed
derived from their ability to get the
attention and keep the favor of
their master, the Chief Executive.
Under such circumstances the
organization man turned adviser is
not likely to tell the chief un
pleasant truths; or will delay
telling them until the fact that the
emperor is obviously wearing no
clothes becomes a public or even
an international scandal.
Within a period of ten months,
the Watergate, which started as a
dark cloud no bigger than a man's
hand, had mushroomed into such a
scandal. Over an extended time
ower which develops
! president
the modern world.
frame something like this hap
pened with the escalation of the
war in Vietnam. President
Johnson's memoirs are poignant
with evidence that he was
surrounded by yes-men who were
unwilling to tell him unpleasant
truths.
The presidential adviser quickly
finds that it pays higher dividends
to be feckless rather than fearless.
If he -dissents too often and too
audibly he will soon be banished to
the outer darkness of presidential
disfavor. He then loses whatever
influence on policy he may have
had, and must either work himself
back into favor or resign.
Under the Johnson ad
ministration, except for George
Ball, about the only important
dissenters on the Vietnam War who
were not at one time pilloried as
defeatists were the anonymous
National Estimates Staff of CIA
hidden deep within their fortress of
exalted brooding at McLean which
bears the proud motto, "The truth
shall make you free." But then
their estimates were for the most
part Ignored, even by the CIA
Director, John McCone, when the
latter advised the President.
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States have never been run by
prayer books, and since the time
of Machiavelli rulers have been
fascinated by his precept that the
wise Prince will employ a judicious
The presidential advis<
pays higher divide
rather than
blend of force and fraud in public
affairs. Nixon's White House staff
was made up of organization men
like John Dean whose careers were
shaped in a fiercely competitive
bureaucratic world where the
survivors simply use whatever
means are closest to hand along a
spectrum ranging from friendly
persuasion to extreme violence.
In the moral perspective of such
men all means along the spectrum
are justified by the "good of the
cause." The cause itself is a
sometime thing: personal career
advancement, the corporate image
and profits, the Cold War, national
security or whatever.
The principle is even more ap
plicable to the Party bureaucracy
in the USSR, where "the good of
the cause" is cited so frequently
that the Nobel prize-winning
novelist, Alexander Solzenitisyn
used it ironically as the title of one
of his earlier novels.
In the subculture of power which
surrounds the president, the self
interest of the state, or even of the
administration, is simply taken for
granted as the highest good,
justifying any means used in its
pursuit. The will to live and to
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of power
hang on to power-however tran
sitory- has thus become a mark of
excellence and the basis of both
private and public morality. But
as the American philosopher
or quickly finds that is
nds to be feckless
fearless.
Santayana has pointed out, only a
brute who had never learned that
he cannot live forever could make
personal survival the basis of
morals. The same observation
applies to the state, or to any given
administration which is constantly
changing its structure and even its
nature, until it may become almost
unrecognizable within the span of a
few years.
Since the days of Lord Acton it
has become a truism that power
tends to corrupt even the most
honorable of men. It also breeds
arrogance and what Voltaire once
called "the subtle poison of am
bition." The highest levels of any
government are of necessity
saturated with it. All of these
factors have combined to tran
sform a false doctrine-the end
justifies the means-into "the good
of the cause" and have led to the
monumental disgrace of the
Watergate and related incidents.
This syndrome will repeat itself in
one form or another until the
president and his advisers learn
that personal survival is not the
basis of morals and that history
will judge them not on how. long
they held on to power, but how well
and how honorably they exercised
it while it was in their trust.
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