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THE JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY.

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It was not until the year 1872 that reawakened Japan undertook the organization of a modern army and navy. Being by this time thoroughly convinced that Western nations could teach them somewhat in the matter of military effectiveness, the new Sat-Cho government, surrounding the Emperor and holding the reins of rule, concluded from the investigations of their world-touring embassy that France could furnish the best drillmasters. French military advisers were therefore employed for the army, but these were afterwards supplanted by Germans. An effective modern army resulted in a surprisingly short time, simply because the soldiers of old Japan were surpassingly brave and loyal through immemorial drill, with a native alertness and thoroughness that gave them immediate grasp of new forms, and a self-control that adds the summit touch to soldiery. Conscription laws of the most radical character annually supply fresh material from the flower of the youth of the land at the rate of forty thousand or more. In the rigid weeding-out process—for the most stringent mental and physical tests are in practice—those who are rejected as fighting men are sent with the army as transporters. The father of the army is the Marquis Yamagata, who has now (at the age of 66) attained to the rank of field marshal. In fifteen years his army has grown from an enlistment of 228,848 men to a strength of 508,268, all told, on a peace footing.

There are six chief military stations, evenly distributed throughout the empire. Baron Yamamoto, the present minister of the navy, is to this branch of the service what Yamagata has been to the army. In 1902, against the most vigorous opposition, he induced parliament to undertake the construction of six first-class battleships within the next ten years, so that Japan has not yet approached the limit of her naval expansion. It was Great Britain that supervised the beginnings, sending out a small school of instructors so long ago as 1867, under the Shogunate, and a larger one in 1873, after the Restoration. Dockyard work, however, was committed to the direction of the French. The principal dockyards are at Yokosuka, in the gulf of Tokyo, but there are others at Kuo, in the Inland Sea; Sasebo, near Nagasaki; Maizuru, on the west coast; and Mororan, in the Island of Yazo. There are four shipbuilding concerns where steel-frame steamers can be constructed; and some idea of the rapidity with which Japan is mastering this difficult industry can be gained from the fact that out of the nine and a half million tonnage of steam vessels passing annually through her ports, fully three million are of native construction. At the beginning of the war with Russia the naval fleet included six first-class battleships, eight armored cruisers, and fourteen protected cruisers. At the close of the first year's fighting three of these vessels had been lost, while the Russian Eastern fleet, of equal fighting strength in the beginning, had been practically swept

from the seas.

The principal naval academy is at Etajima, an island of the beautiful Inland Sea. Applicants must be at least sixteen years of age, and are subjected to rigid examination. The training is strict in the extreme, and jiu-jitsu is the favorite physical exercise. The average age of the navy is the lowest in the world, as is also the average height; no one over 20 years of age is accepted for enlistment, and the average stature is only five feet and four inches.

It is a theory that "in Japan every subject has a chance for a commission in the imperial navy," but the theory is hardly borne out by the facts. And this applies also to the army. The Sat-Cho plans have a virtual monopoly here, as well as in civil affairs. The province of Satsuma has not only furnished such army leaders as Nogi, Kuroki and Oyama, but practically the whole of the navy, from Togo and Yamamoto downward. In the Japanese mind the Satsuma men are credited chiefly with courage, the Choshu men with sagacity—therefore the former are soldiers and sailors, men of dash and daring, while the latter are diplomats and chiefs of administration. But the fact is, these two Southern clans simply gained control of the government in 1868, and have never relinquished it since—clan-government having supplanted the Shogunate.

The hero of Port Arthur, Nogi Kiten, is the Japanese ideal of a soldier. His enthusiastic admirers even call him the "incarnation of the imperial war-god." He has given utterance to his own conception of the warrior-life in the following striking language: "When a man becomes a soldier he must be perfectly willing to lead henceforth a life that is somewhat different from the life of an ordinary man. It is impossible for him thereafter to enjoy liberty and wealth in the same manner as his fellows. What I mean is this: that the soldier who would perform his duties with credit on a battlefield must, of necessity, have trained himself to perform all that is expected of him in the days of peace. There ought not to be any neglect or any defects in his daily life. The man who would rightfully aspire to the honor of fighting under the sun-flag must first have learned to be a man through the conquest of himself in times of peace."

That Nogi has practiced what he preaches is proved by his memorable words when the news was brought to him that his eldest son—the pride and hope of every household—had been killed in the battle of Nanshan. "I am glad he died so splendidly," the father said. "It was the greatest honor he could have. As for the funeral rites in his memory, they might as well be postponed for awhile. A little later on they may be performed in connection with those to the memory of my second son, Hoten, and myself." His second son fell during the last days of the siege around Port Arthur.

This wondrous spirit of loyalty inheritance from feudal days, is not confined to the officers of the army, but is shared by the humblest of the people. The Russian war has afforded numberless examples. There was the aged mother, for example, who learned that her soldier-son was detained at home on her account. Slaying herself in patriotic sacrifice, she withdrew the bloody dagger in time to hand it to her

son with the Spartan injunction that he should plunge it into the hearts of the enemy. And a story comes of a humble jinrikisha man, who, because he could find no caretaker for his motherless children, slew them and buried them in the family temple grounds, that he might go off to the war. The blanket where-in he wrapped their little dead bodies as he took them to their burial was afterward cut into shreds by the equally patriotic priest and distributed as priceless relics to the pilgrims who came to do honor at the sacrificial grave. What wonder that Japan wins victories?

And loyalty does more than win battles. It is loyalty in connection with an enlightened clan-government that accounts for the remarkable courtesy of the army. Much as we should like to believe it, doubtless we should err in accounting for the good behavior of the Japanese army altogether on the grounds of good nature, or deep-set convictions of mercy. The inherent cruelty of the Japanese soldier is far too thoroughly established, and the barbarous conduct of these same troops on the occasion of the former fall of Port Arthur, only ten years ago, is of much too recent occurrence, to allow of such an inner transfiguration of character as would explain on purely moral principles their humane behavior toward the Russians. The true explanation, however, is hardly less wonderful. The clan-government which radiates from the imperial palace in Tokyo into every regiment of the army and every ship of the navy is one of the most astute bodies of men on earth. They are profoundly watchful of international sentiment in their desire for international regard, and they are also fully familiar with the reverential loyalty of the troops to their Emperor, which they have used every means to enhance. Having incurred the opprobrium of the civilized world on account of the Port Arthur massacre, they have forestalled the repetition of such occurrences. How? By an extremely simple expedient in view of Japanese loyalty. Messages are sent in the name of the Emperor commanding merciful treatment, and the regard of the troops for their sun-god is such as to serve in the place of a conscience, even amid the carnage of battle, or in spite of temptations to pillage. It will be a serious time of transition when their worship of the Emperor is destroyed.

In accounting for the martial strength of the new Japan we must not overlook the commercial astuteness that has made possible the "sinews of war." Poor as the Island Empire is, her financiers have made such use of their resources as to produce almost incredible development in an amazingly short space of time.—The Southern Home.

ENGLAND RESPONSIBLE

For Russo-Japanese War—Germany's Designs in the Far East.

More than once has it been openly stated in French reviews that England is really responsible for the Russo-Japanese war. The French political writer, Andre Bheradame, in an article in the Correspondent, declares:

Russia believes, and believes rightly, that England and the adherents of Lord Curzon have made it their business to bring about the Russo-Japanese war. At the same time, Russia quite overlooks the policy of Germany, which for the last twenty-five years has been systematically directed to the definite object of getting Russia entangled in the affairs of the far East.

The game of Germany, played with so much skill and discretion which M. Cheradame refers to is none other than that inaugurated by Bismarck. On many occasions the Iron Chancellor is said to have shown a passionate desire to oust Russia from all participation in European affairs and give her the fullest liberty of action in Asia. To his friends at St. Petersburg he is reported to have said: "Russia has noth-

ing to do with the West; her mission is in Asia, for there she represents civilization."

In 1880, during the most acute period of the negotiations between Russia and China respecting Kulja and Ili territory, the action of the German minister, von Brandt, the writer explains, affords the most conclusive proof that at that time the chancellor of William I. was maneuvering to entangle Russia in the far East. Mr. von Brandt, who has taken so active a part in the affairs of eastern Asia and has done so much to introduce Germany into Chinese waters, was a disciple and an admirer of Bismarck.

In proof of his assertions, M. Cheradame proceeds to quote from the political correspondence of the minister of one of the great Western powers at Peking, then quite unknown to the public. When the Russo-Chinese conflict was at its height, and war was threatening, the diplomatist, whose name is withheld, wrote in effect to his government in the summer of 1880:

Not only did Mr. von Brandt advise all the Christian powers to agree simultaneously to crush China and each seize what was most expedient, but he endeavored to push matters to the worst by exalting the advantages of a war between Russia and China. My recent conversations with my colleague, Mr. von Brandt, confirm me in the idea that encouragements to carry out such a strange policy must have been given by the cabinet of Berlin to that of St. Petersburg. As soon as the war should have broken out, Mr. von Brandt made no mystery of the intention of his government to lay hands on any well-chosen position whence the navy of Germany could usefully second the operations of her commerce or the action of her diplomacy at Peking.

Again, early in 1881, the Western diplomatist pointed out that while Mr. von Brandt was driving Russia to war, Germany was supplying arms to the Celestial Empire. He wrote:

I learn that 100,000 Mauser rifles have been sold by German merchants, and that over 20,000 have already been delivered. It might be of use to send these particulars to St. Petersburg, if only to enlighten the government of the Czar as to the views which inspire German policy in the presence of the difficulties pending between Russia and China.

The next instance of German policy in China cited by M. Cheradame is the Kiaochow affair. Here he shows that in 1891 Germany was entertaining secret plans with regard to it.

Lastly, M. Cheradame deals with the Russo-Japanese war. He thinks that Germany desired war, but hopes that Russia will win, for a victorious Russia on the Pacific is expected to be as profitable to Germany as the power of the Czar in Europe is disadvantageous. On the other hand, if Russia does not get Korea, and if she must abandon southern Manchuria to the Mikado, Germany will become the first enemy of Japan. Russia, embroiled in the affairs of the far East, will leave the Balkan peninsula, Constantinople, and Turkey in Asia almost free to German influence. Even if Russia triumphs, it is certain that for many years she cannot be an "offensive" military danger to Germany, and thus the military power of Germany in the old world will be almost doubled without a farthing's extra expense for armaments. Germany seems to know how to deceive Russia, and Russia, concludes M. Cheradame, has always defended herself badly against her patient and tenacious German adversary.

SUGGESTED RUSSO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

It appears that there has been some support in Japan to the suggestion, which was originally credited to the Emperor of Germany, that, after the war, a friendly understanding amounting to an alliance, should be brought about between Russia and Japan. The Anglo-Japanese alliance has not, in the opinion

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of a number of prominent Japanese periodicals, come up to the expectation of the Mikado's government. Dissatisfaction with it has been concealed by the thin veneer of politeness which the Japanese express toward England so long as the alliance actually exists. Although the Japanese journals in general do not refer to this subject, many of the leading men are, it is claimed, looking forward to the time when the island empire will readjust all her diplomatic relations.

The whole ground of these relations is covered in an article, entitled "The Conclusion of Peace Between Russia and Japan," which appears in the Taiyo (Tokio). The writer, Mr. T. Hayakawa, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives, begins by stating that Russia is not by any means so formidable a power as the world has heretofore believed. If you turn over the pages of the history of Russian expansion, he says, "you will at once perceive that the Muscovite has never played a fair game." Russian aggression, he goes on to say, has been directed, not against civilized nations with modern military equipment, but against backward races, such as those in Siberia, or against such miserably equipped nations as Turkey and other minor peoples in the Balkans. Russia's real strength had never been fully tested until it came into collision with that of Japan. The secret of Russian success, this writer believes, lies in the fact that she has heretofore wielded her weapons only against weaker enemies, as well as in the fact that she enjoys a most favorable geographic situation, which prevents successful invasion. Her geographical situation also has stimulated her desire for expansion. In order to develop her commerce and to advance her civilization, Russia found it absolutely necessary to establish outlets on southern waters.

Intoxicated by her successes, which had been easily achieved in dealing with her weaker antagonists, Russia underestimated Japan's power and resources. Always modest, and generally too meek, Japan had always acquiesced in Russia's propositions. Thus, the northern bear robbed the island empire of Saghalien, and, in conjunction with Germany and France, took from her the Liao-Tung Peninsula at the close of the Chino-Japanese war. The negotiations leading up to the present struggle further impressed Russia with the patience of the island nation. Russia's arrogant and challenging attitude was due really to complete ignorance of the resources of her little enemy.

IS A RUSSO JAPANESE ALLIANCE POSSIBLE?

A treaty of alliance between two nations on a close footing is impossible so long as one has no regard for the rights of the other. Up to the present moment, it has been utterly impossible for Russia and Japan to come to an understanding of such a nature. But, now that the Muscovite government has become convinced of the prowess of the Japanese nation, it is quite possible that St. Petersburg would really desire to form an entente cordiale with the Tokio government. The gist of the proposition advanced by Mr. Hayakawa is found in his closing paragraph: It is neither possible nor wise to entirely drive the Russians out of Manchuria. An attempt to expel them from northern China would mean the treme-

dously greater task of wiping them out entirely from Siberia, a task which no sane man would ever dream of accomplishing. So long as Russia holds Siberia, it is but natural that she will attempt to force her way to the Eastern seas. The danger of the Russian advance in the far East lies, not in the fact of the advance, but in its military nature. If this advance should be of a peaceful nature, aimed at the promotion of her commercial interests, without jeopardizing the sovereignty of China and Korea, there is no reason why Japan should not respect Russian rights in Manchuria. The present war is waged because Japan was forced to deliver Manchuria and Korea from the oppression of Russia. When Japan's protectorate over Korea has been universally recognized, and when Manchuria has been returned to the Chinese Government, Japan's aims have been well-nigh accomplished. If she insists on curbing Russian influence entirely in the far East, time, we believe, will tell that Japan has blundered. But if, generously casting aside hostile feelings after the peace treaty, the now belligerent nations enter into an alliance, together they might prove the strongest force in preserving the peace of the far East. Russia is now fully aware that as an opponent Japan is very formidable, but as an ally she could be made a strong and reliable friend. If Russia will renounce her ambition for military aggrandizement, and will extend her hand in friendly relationship to Japan, with the view of promoting her own commercial interests in eastern Asia, we Japanese will gladly welcome her as our friend and ally.

ODESSA LEADING CITY OF SOUTHERN RUSSIA.

The city of Odessa, the scene of the most startling developments in the growth of revolution in the Czar's empire, is the most important city and seaport in Southern Russia and the fourth city of the empire in population. It is situated in the government of Kherson, on an elevation sloping toward an inlet of the Black Sea. It lies about 32 miles northeast of the mouth of the Dniester and 938 miles by rail southwest of Moscow.

The general appearance and atmosphere of Odessa are rather European than Russian. The city was built during the nineteenth century, and is, therefore the youngest among the large cities of Russia. It is regularly laid out around the bay, and has a number of fine streets and squares, from which magnificent views of the sea are obtained. The most popular boulevard is the Nikolayevsky boulevard, from which a grand stairway leads to the bay.

The Russians of Odessa comprise scarcely one-third of the inhabitants of the city, about 150,000 of the residents being Jews and the remainder Greeks, Armenians, Turks and people of various European nationalities. In general the members of the lower classes of Odessa are persons of the most desperate character.

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