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By D. D. HOOVER.

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## The sinking of the Weehawken off Charleston Harbor.

The New York Herald, of Saturday, contains the particulars of the sinking of the Monitor Weehawken off Charleston, on the 6th inst. Its correspondent writes:

Saturday had been a bright and beautiful day, with scarcely a breath of air stir, and with a calm unruffled sea. During the night a breeze sprang up, and the wind blowing calmly at daylight on Sunday, increased by noon to a violent gale. The iron clad fleet was lying in its usual anchorage. The frigate New Ironsides was stationed off Morris Island at a distance about one mile due East from Fort Wagner, or, as it is now called, Fort Strong. North of the Ironsides lay the flag-ship Philadelphia, distant about four hundred yards. The Weehawken was next in line, anchored two or three hundred yards to the Northward of the flag-ship. The Montank was on picket duty between Fort Sumter and Fort Moultrie. Astern of the Ironsides lay the Nahant and Passaic—the latter the farthest away from the flag-ship, and nearer than any other vessel to the Morris Island shore. The South Carolina and the Home were rocking on the restless tide some five or six hundred yards astern of the Ironsides.

The above was the position of the fleet when the first signal of distress was made from the Weehawken, at a few minutes before two o'clock. The signal was seen and answered at once by the flag-ship, from which four boats were dispatched to her assistance, and by the South Carolina, which sent two of her boats to the Weehawken's aid. The tugs Dandelion and Iris were also at once called up, and with them Commander Ducean, of the Weehawken who chanced to be on the flagship, and in conversation with the Admiral, when the signal was made, proceeded immediately, with the hope of running his vessel on the beach. He had scarcely left the Admiral when the officer of the deck made out from the Weehawken a new signal, and immediately reported her to be sinking.

A moment after she settled swiftly down by the head, careened slightly over to starboard, and disappeared beneath the waves.

It is impossible to convey any idea of the appalling nature of this disaster. It came with the suddenness of a thunderbolt. When the first signal of distress was made no one divined how serious was the danger, and when, at length, the vessel went down, it was difficult for those who saw her disappear to credit even the evidence of their own senses. The confusion on the flagship, arising mainly from the difficulty of launching her boats, and the desire of both officers and men to be first in them, was most intense and painful. The wind was now blowing with great fury, and the boats which hastened from all sides to the scene encountered great peril in picking up from the water the few who had succeeded in getting away from the Weehawken before she sank. Almost at the moment she went down some twenty or more sprang to the boats and succeeded in getting away. As many others were rescued from the surging waves by the launches of the flag ship, the South Carolina, and the tug boats Dandelion and Iris. Thirty perished.

All day the Weehawken had labored heavily in the sea, which kept her decks constantly submerged and which frequently swept in huge volumes into her forward hatch. Towards noon the crew commenced paying out chain, to ease her; but, accustomed as they were, in every gale, to the shipping of such seas, it is believed that they had grown confident and careless of danger, and paid no heed to the encroaching waters until it was too late to resist them. They dreamed of no peril till the waves had fairly yawned to swallow them. Then, when it was known for a certainty that the vessel was to be lost, a panic of fright and fear benumbed them, and the terror-stricken crew below had little power to help themselves. There were men in irons between decks, and the sergeant-at-arms rushed frantically away to release them. Poor fellows, they went down. There were invalids in the sick bay, and to

their relief the surgeon sent his steward, who never returned. There were firemen at the furnace, to whom vain shrieks for a helping hand at the pumps were made. A few of the confident were rushing to their quarters to save themselves. It was in the midst of scenes like these that the Weehawken went down.

I believe that none of the officers perished save the four assistant engineers, who were overtaken by the flood before they could make any effort to escape. Commander Ducean had only taken command of the Weehawken on Saturday, having been detached from the Passaic to relieve Commander Calhoun. The papers of the ship sank with her.

The yeoman was brought alive on board the flag-ship, but died in a spasms a few moments afterwards. Various parties were picked up and taken to the nearest vessels, where every provision was made for their comfort and restoration. Those of the crew who were saved are now scattered in small squads throughout the fleet. It is impossible to procure at present the names of those who were lost.

**YANKEE BARBARITY.**—The shelling of Charleston on Christmas day was the amusement of Lincoln's army on Morris Island. They have not the nerve to attack Charleston to take it, but they have a special malignity in throwing shells into it to destroy it. They have so far burnt a few houses, killed two women, and shot off a leg from an elderly lady, and caused a number to leave their beds at midnight, with half-clad children, exposed to the piteous blast of a cold North-east wind. Can the despicable Yankees suppose for a moment that their petty malignity of violating the rules of civilized warfare will have any other effect than to rouse still more the indignation of our people? Can they suppose that their infamous brutality has any tendency to humble Carolina spirit and destroy the abiding confidence that their efforts are to come to naught? God forbid that any woman or child should tolerate the thought of yielding an inch to the contemptible invader. We will succeed in spite of them.

**YANKEE RAID ON CHESTER.**—Two of the escaped prisoners from the Columbia jail, were brought into our town, on Thursday last, by Mr. Neilly Hardin and other citizens, of the Western part of our District, by whom they were taken, near Bullock's Creek Church, on Sunday last. One of them was Captain Chamberlain, the other Adjutant Camp, both from Connecticut, captured at Battery Wagner. Through the courtesy of Mr. McDonald we were permitted to have a conversation with them. We found them true and loyal subjects and great admirers of the genius of Abraham the 1st—they defend his emancipation proclamation as a wise war measure—say they are fighting for their country, and love, venerate and adore the "Glorious old Flag," and look forward hopefully to the time when, cured of our delusions, we will come back into their fond embraces; meantime they are for a vigorous prosecution of the war. They are right intelligent men, but have been on the coast, where they have seen but little of the hardships and horrors of war.

[Chester Standard.]

**ATTRACTION INCIDENT.**—Whilst the French troops were encamped at Boulouge, public attention was much excited by the daring attempt at escape made by an English sailor. This person having escaped from the depot and gained the borders of the sea, the woods on which served him for concealment, constructed, with no other instrument than a knife, a boat entirely of the bark of trees. When the weather was fair he mounted a tree and looked out for the English flag; and having at last observed a British cruiser, he ran to the shore with his boat on his back, and was about to trust himself on his frail vessel to the waves, when he was pursued, arrested and loaded with chains. Everybody in the army was anxious to see the boat; and Napoleon, having at length heard of the affair, sent for the sailor, and interrogated him. "You must," said Napoleon, "have had a great desire to see your country again, since you could resolve to trust yourself on the open sea in so frail a bark. I suppose you have left a sweetheart there?" "No," said the sailor, "but a poor infirm mother, whom I was anxious to see." "And you shall see her," said Napoleon, giving at the same time orders to set him at liberty, and to bestow upon him a considerable sum of money for his mother, observing that she must be a good mother who had so good a son.

Letters from prisoners on Johnson Island state that they receive less than half rations.

## Gen. Halleck's Criticism of the Yankee Campaign of the past Year.

The Yankee commander-in-chief, Gen. Halleck, has made a long report of the Yankee campaign of the past year, in which he most successfully lifts all blame from his own shoulders and neatly distributes it upon the backs of the commanding generals. Nothing failed that he ordered, and nothing succeeded that he did not order. His vanity is equalled by nothing but his falsehood. The New York Times, in commenting upon his report, says:

Gen. Burnside, on his own admission, is shown to have proceeded contrary to the wishes of his superior in his march on Fredericksburg, the famous blunder of his pontoons is put deliberately off his shoulders, and the defeat of Fredericksburg is attributed to the failure or disobedience of Gen. Franklin in his flank attack. Gen. Hooker's unfortunate campaign is quickly placed outside of the responsibility of the general-in-chief, from the fact that no reports were rendered to him by this officer.—Gen. Dix is sharply rapped over the knuckles for his campaign against Richmond. In the battle of Gettysburg we discover, to our surprise, that an "error" of Gen. Sickles' nearly ruined us, and Gen. Meade himself gets but faint praise for his victory; while the escape of Lee over the Potomac calls out some words which, though not directly asserting, imply the strongest censure of the reaction of that general. Gen. Pope is convicted of a gross blunder in his operations against the Indians. Gen. Banks receives no praise, and it is intimated that Fort Hudson could have been taken much earlier had we known his weakness.

Mr. Grant's campaign alone, in the rear of Vicksburg, is spoken of with enthusiasm, though here the great merit of that officer seems to be that he always obeyed every order from Washington, and never complained of want of reinforcements! If, by this intimation, the war office of the general-in-chief intend to take any of the glory of his campaign to themselves, it must be remembered that we have the honest confession of the President over his own signature, that he never had faith in the practicability of the rear attack on Vicksburg.

The review of Rosecrans' and Burnside's campaigns for the possession of Tennessee is, of course, severe and searching. If we may take their own statement, the department were exceedingly dissatisfied with the delay of Gen. Rosecrans after the battle of Murfreesboro, and were constantly urging him forward toward Georgia. The latter, from over caution, and probably not believing that he had a sufficient number of men for so great an advance, waited month after month to strengthen his position and to organize. Gen. Halleck claims that he ought to have advanced during the siege of Vicksburg. He admits that when at length he did move, his combinations were of the most remarkable and brilliant nature, forcing the enemy out of Tennessee without a battle or any especial loss on our part. The flanking and taking of Chattanooga he is forced also to admit as very efficient military movements. The telegraphic dispatches embodied in the report certainly prove that the general-in-chief had at the time a clearer idea of the dangers to which both Rosecrans and Burnside were exposed than either of those officers.

Burnside was ordered to connect his right with Rosecrans' left, and, if possible, occupy Dalton and the passes into Georgia and North Carolina, as that the two armies might act as one body, and support each other. Rosecrans was not to advance into Georgia and Alabama at present, but to fortify his position and connect with Burnside. If his week point—his right and the communications with Nashville—were threatened, he was to hand over Chattanooga to Burnside, and swing round to cover that flank. At the same time forces were ordered up from Memphis and other quarters to guard that side, as well as his long line of communications. Gen. Burnside, we are curtly informed, entirely disobeyed or neglected his orders, and did not connect with the army of the Cumberland, leaving a great gap between the two armies, and exposing his outlying detachments, so that several were cut to pieces. It cannot be doubted that had the instructions of the department been strictly followed the disaster of Chickamauga would not have occurred.

Still it must be remembered that we have here but one side of the case. The officers so severely criticised are not permitted by military etiquette to answer. No doubt Gen. Burnside could show various satisfactory reasons for his want of concentration, of which the public know nothing; and possibly General Rosecrans could furnish equally plausible reasons for his six months' delay. The defeat of Gen. Rosecrans' right wing is attributed primarily

by Gen. Halleck to two causes—to his advancing with so wide a line, (forty miles in length,) and to a mistake of Gen. Wood in the battle, who was ordered to strengthen another portion of the line, and did it, not by closing up, but by a march around to the rear, thus leaving a gap for the enemy's attack. Gen. Thomas' resistance on the left wing is characterized—for a wonder—with warm praise.

This defense of Gen. Halleck against the imputations of the public in regard to Rosecrans' campaign, ingeniously ignores the especial point of the public censure, which was that the reinforcements so hurriedly sent to the army of the Cumberland in September, were not sent a month or two months earlier, when released from the siege of Vicksburg. We demand, naturally, of a general-in-chief, that he should look over the whole field and not act spasmodically or sensationally. If Rosecrans was not strong enough when he entered Georgia in September, the department knew it beforehand as well as then, and ought to have supplied the needed strength. They knew that Bragg might at any time be reinforced from Virginia, and they ought to have provided against the contingency. They had the men on the Mississippi. Why were they scattered off over Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana? What was Arkansas to us for a moment, compared with a decisive march to Atlanta?

## A Change.

There has been a great change in most of our people since the commencement of the war. At first there was a generous readiness to respond to every call of the Government, and every wish of a military commander. When clothing and blankets were asked for the soldiers, every family hastened to send in its contributions. When Beauregard at Manassas made proclamation among the people around that he needed their slaves to assist in digging his fortifications, they sent them in with alacrity. When he asked for their wagons, they would have sent them to the last one if he had wanted them all.

It is not so now. Nothing but draft or impressment will avail. Most men have now all they can do, and how long they can delay it. The cause of this change we believe to be easy of explanation. In the beginning of the war, the people were not thinking of making money. Their minds were intent on a successful prosecution of the war, nor did they deem a state of war a time for money-making, but a time of general trial and privation, when citizens must all stand by each other as brothers. But opportunities of gain soon and unexpectedly showed themselves. The appetite grew upon what it fed, until like that of the wolf which has once lapped human blood, it became a consuming passion. Many a man who at first had a heart for his country, and held himself and all he had at his call, has now turned aside from his noble devotion, and thrown himself headlong into the demoralizing pursuit of wealth.—*Richmond Sentinel.*

This change deserves explanation. We submit to the *Sentinel* and other exchanges who have observed and regretted the change, the question, how far it has been induced or aggravated by incompetence and want of earnestness and appreciation on the part of officials.

Were the laborers originally tendered freely and patriotically to the use of Generals and engineers used as they should have been?

Have the volunteers who rallied to arms been in all cases treated as citizens and soldiers should be?

Have the appointments for the purchasing, equipping, storing and supplying departments of the army, been made with reference to qualifications for a war footing or for a peace establishment?

Have we suffered more from want of men or of officers?

Where we have suffered for want of men, was the absence of men due to want of firmness and vigilance in discipline on the part of officers?

What is there in "the situation," at present to excite alarm? Who ever heard of a determined and united people being subjugated by an enemy that could not even march an army through their territory? Have the Yankees been able to do that? Why, they have been eighteen months working their way through Tennessee, a State about one hundred miles in width from North to South, and no where else have they gained a mile within the year past by an advance upon land! How long, at this rate, will it take them to penetrate into the interior of Georgia?—*Char. Cou.*

General Michael Corcoran died at Fairfax C. H. on the 22d inst., from injuries received from a fall from his horse.