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## POLITICAL.

Extract from B. B. Cook's address, delivered before the Anti-Tariff Agricultural Society of Fairfield, at its first anniversary, in July 1829, at their request.

"I come now, gentlemen, to speak of your political rights.

"The political rights of the people in the United States are so complex it is indispensable, that I should speak something of their nature, before I point out any evils resulting from their improper administration. It is a matter of serious regret, that we who support the forms of power in this country, by taxation in every proper and improper shape know so little about the full picture of its complicated machinery. All power is continually in the people; they can make and unmake governments—alter or amend or entirely abolish the forms of power in the state.—

The constitution of South Carolina is the form in which the people chose to transact the affairs of society in this state. It is a pure representative democracy, in which the people, for convenience, elect and send agents to act for them in different departments. They act for and in place of the people. The people are the sovereigns, and their agents represent that sovereignty. This government is called a republic. The actual limitations of the representative, are written in the constitution, which is the form of their power—these prohibit them from enacting laws contrary to certain well established fundamental republican principles, and from violating the known rules of justice and propriety.

These exceptions to the power of the Legislature, give to it the right of legislation, generally, over all other subjects. It is a confirmation of such a power—it is co-extensive with human affairs. A measured quantum of this power has been, however, granted to the federal Congress; chiefly what relates to the business of international regulation at home and abroad. The implied restrictions are such, as the right the people have at all times to direct their representatives how to vote on occasions of more than ordinary interest. It is clear the people have this right, and the representative is bound so to act or resign his trust.

The revolution of '76 which pressed the colonies into a close alliance, by their common danger and common interests, opened the way to the states, after the declaration of independence, to unite more closely in the form of a confederacy. This union was not changed from the federative to a national form by the subsequent adoption of the constitution. It is therefore simply a confederacy of sovereign and independent states. It is a government at which the states themselves assemble by their representatives, to carry on their affairs with one another and with foreign powers. The constitution for the confederacy is the form of power by which state delegations have the right to pass laws on such subjects as the people of the states have committed to them in that capacity.

Nor does the popular branch of Congress, as has been asserted, alter the federal feature. There is no nationality in it—it is as much federal as the senate. The people nowhere cross lines to vote for a member to Congress. The people of North and South Carolina never vote at the same election ground. It is not the people of an entire nation, but of one state prudently retaining in their own hands the direct choice of one branch of the federal Congress. The supposition that the confederacy has any national features is an absurdity. Could the people of France form a confederation? Not with France! They might with Austria federate France as an independent kingdom. So the people of the thirteen United States could in no otherwise confederate together, than as people of sovereign and independent states; sovereign in themselves and independent of one another.

The advocates of nationality are uniformly advocates for power—for right to legislate by implication and liberal construction. They truly legislate as at the head of one great nation, and not as the agents of separate and independent sovereignties whose general interests are in many respects essentially different. This national doctrine is the source of consolidation. Its advocates have given us national measures—the bank, internal improvements, and the tariff. They intend to give us a mild monarchy, Hamilton's and Madison's strong executive, and finally Aaron Burr's military despotism. But, sir, let us have the union with the constitution, without it the states may be converted to nationality. The federal is in all its features a government of limitations. The enumeration of powers in the compact for its formation excludes all others. A grant of power is itself a limitation as respects the parties. The grantor gives up his right to exercise, while the grantee by accepting one, confirms the right in the grantor to whatever of power is not explicitly yielded, and the power acquired must be exercised strictly, within the letter of the grant. The federal government must therefore move within the sphere of powers expressly allowed to it by the states in the constitution. It is moreover in the exercise of its powers, subjected by the people of the states, to the same restrictions in passing laws in violation of fundamental republican doctrines as the states are. It is precisely in the same situation as respects the right to violate the known and established rules of justice and fair dealing. It is co-ordinate with the state governments; and altho' its laws are in many respects the supreme laws of the land, it can in no case coerce a state government. It is in many respects inferior and subordinate. It is altogether so, as to sovereignty. It was created by the states. It represents sovereignty, but has none of its own. It has no jurisdiction within the territory of the states.—It cannot exercise some of its constitutional powers without the consent of the states.—In times of peace it cannot build a fort or erect magazines of deposit in the limits of a

state, without its consent to a cession of so much of its territory. It must be obvious that its bank, and even what is proudly called its district courts are the tenants at will of the sovereign states. (I hope this will not be called ultra radicalism.) Its drafts on the militia must be through the intervening power of the state authority. It is absurd and ridiculous to suppose that an unconstitutional law passed by such a government can for a moment bind the state sovereignties.

Thus, Mr. resident and gentlemen, I have given the out-lines of the two kinds of governments in the United States. I am certain, sir, I have not filled up the picture. It is with exultation we hold in our hands the masterpiece of political wisdom and human prudence. It is well balanced, well checked and when well administered, will give to the people more happiness and liberty, and to the confederacy more glory and power, than has ever been the lot of any country or people in ancient or modern times.

On a review of the powers granted to Congress, there is one that it was not safe for the people of the states to have given to that legislature. It is the right to levy indirect taxes, specifically, duties and excises.—These are taxes on commodities for sale, on persons holding them, or on machinery for their production. They fall directly on the merchant, the importer, or the maker: they are paid indirectly by the consumer. They are frauds upon the people, laid on one man, but paid by another. They are a kind of government smuggling, not more on the pockets than the liberty of the people. In despotisms, the more indirectly the government can levy and collect revenue, the more independent it will be of the people. Indirect taxation is the surest guaranty of direct oppression and of usurped power. In free countries, the people should know when, and how, and for what, they pay their money. There should be no intermediate resource. Money is power; the people should always be consulted before they give it up. When the government wants money to support a measure, let it go directly to the pockets of the people for it.—If it is a good measure it will have nine to one for it: if a bad one it will have nine to one against it. It would be difficult, for the government, on this policy, to get along with expensive, unconstitutional projects. It would be a grand safeguard to the power and influence of the people. It would make for freedom and against oppression.

I must now, shew what congress has made itself, by encroaching on the power of the state sovereignties.

While the states have shown no disposition to take back the powers given to the confederacy; the Congress have advanced step after step on the reserved rights of the states. The friends of consolidation, under cover of the Monroe administration, and by the magic power of construction made the constitution by terms, every thing and nothing. Whatever measure they wanted was conjured out of the general welfare, and carried by the supremacy of the majority. The bank, internal improvements and the tariff were successfully the strong measures of the strong government party. Except the Tariff, they cannot be charged to sectional interests. The North, South, East and West supported them. Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Clay, Mr. Adams and Mr. Ingham moved together in great style, in the "splendid phantoms of the sun." They did not hesitate to pronounce upon all who dared to oppose their movements for power and imperial spender, the contemptuous epithet of "infinitely stupid; and as infinitely beneath their notice."

There is no hinting in the constitution at the banking power. It is dangerous in the hands of the Federal Government. It gives them revenue independent of the people of the states. It calls the capitalists of the country to its support. It will at length swallow up in its great vortex all the banking business of the states. It has already proved to be a great draw back upon state competency, and however desirable such a circulating medium for the states may be, to those states who have no paper credit of their own, it is too great an engine of power to be placed in the hands of the Federal Government.

Internal improvement as acknowledged by Mr. McDuffie while addressing the house in favor of the measure, cannot constitutionally be carried on by Congress—not with the consent of North Carolina—no, nor of any other state. Congress and one state cannot alter nor amend the constitution. There is no such provision. This measure is well calculated not to strengthen the Union but to consolidate the power of the Federal Government. It has been and will be sectional in its application. It is directly in contravention of state rights and of state sovereignty. In its administration, it will always be the stepping stone to office. It is the source of too much favor and patronage, and partiality, and of sectional legislation, to be tolerated for one moment by a free people.—The right to carry on internal improvements in the states; except what may be required in time of war for facilities of conveyance &c. does not—and never ought to belong to the Federal Legislature.

The Tariff, tho' it bears more immediately on the agricultural class, has been so often and so ably discussed and exposed, it would be a work of supererogation for me to give it a particular discussion. It attacks us as tillers of the soil at so many points, that I have been compelled to notice it slightly. I shall pass over it here, sir, with the intention of shewing its effects upon the tariff states themselves, when I come to speak of your agricultural interests.

Other measures of the Federal Government have been adopted, at different times which mark distinctly, its tendency to the usurpation of unceded power. Such were the Alien, and Sedition laws. Such was the embargo. The Federal and Republican administrations of the Government have concurred in this conspiracy against the states. It seems that a mixture of the two parties is the most dangerous of all. It is an unnatural union, producing nothing good. John Adams gave us the Alien and Sedition laws. Jefferson, the embargo and Madison the Bank. What did Mr. Monroe; who leveled all parties when he came into office to one mongrel coalition. What

has it produced. Mountains of iniquity internal improvements and the Tariff. I fear this unnatural union will end in total disaster and disunion. The congress have assumed unknown powers. Three fourths of the confederacy is already virtually consolidated. With the engines of power it now holds; the Bank, internal improvements and the Tariff, all usurped, it has almost grasped the balance into its own hands. The all important question must soon be decided whether the confederacy shall still exist or, whether it shall be broken up or, whether the States must fall back into the degraded condition of provinces and departments. May God save the confederacy with the constitution!

If the southern states abate of their position and fall to obtain on proper grounds the repeal of those measures or upon such an event do not take the high stand of maintaining their rights and defending their sovereignty from every violation, and of protecting the known privileges of their people from every unnecessary and unconstitutional restriction, then sir, all is gone, and it may be gone forever. If the dreadful catastrophe does happen, it may be matter of curiosity to enquire what the form of government will then be. It will no doubt retain for some time its republican forms. The power and prerogation of the Executive will, at length, either be enlarged—or the senate will declare itself perpetual, and take all power into its own hands. As soon as one or the other of these forms have been invested with the "plenitude" of power, the popular form will be entirely abolished. Thus, sir, it will become a monarchy or a Republican aristocracy. In either case, it must be a despotism—more, sir, it must be a Military despotism. Such a government could alone control the almost unmanageable materials of which it would be composed. Governors, Deputies and Prætors would infest us from the imperial city, the kinsmen and friends of those in power, the desperate in fortune, wicked men, without principle, with power to levy tribute and raise subsidies. Bands of soldiers would necessarily be quartered among us, for their protection and support. We must be taxed and subsidized to maintain troops commissioned to watch over and keep us down. It would, sir, be a government of the worst and most corrupt class of men over the best and most virtuous."

## TO THE PEOPLE.

The following very able State Paper takes the ground repeatedly urged in the TELESCOPE. We have met with nothing comparable to it in sound and enlightened as well as patriotic views. Let it be read. Let it be well considered. Let the people see that the doctrines of the Telescope are likely to be those of Virginia and we hope sincerely of the SOUTH.—Editor.

(From the Richmond Enquirer.)

## RETROSPECTS—No. XV.

COMPILATIONS—REVIEWS—AND REFLECTIONS.

## "UNION."

Disunion—disastrous to the whole U. S.—But not equally disastrous to each of the several States.

It will appear from an examination of the last No. that both the author of "Union" and the writer, concur in opinion; that the union of these states is actually put in jeopardy, by the various intermeddlings and usurpations of the general government; but particularly by the tariff and internal improvement acts. Both also, concur in opinion, that such disunion would, probably, be extremely disastrous to the whole United States and ought to be deprecated by every real patriot in the nation; but they differ in this material respect. The writer of "Union," applies the disastrous consequences of disunion, in an equal degree, to every individual state—whereas, the writer thinks, the disastrous consequences would be much greater to some states, than to others; nor would the writer, so far concur with the author of "Union," as to admit, that disunion would be the greatest possible disaster, that could befall the U. S.—should the author entertain such an opinion. The writer thinks a consolidated despotism, would be an infinitely greater disaster than disunion; of course he thinks, the tariff acts, and internal improvement permanently fixed upon this union, as an infinitely greater disaster—as they must necessarily eventuate in the very worst of consolidated despotisms: provided the union should continue under their most baneful influence. The inevitable effects of such a government, would be the utter annihilation of human liberty, and with it, all human rights, prosperity and happiness. The writer has often been astonished to observe how little the real characteristics of the tariff and internal improvement acts, have been considered and understood. It seems as if the public mind cannot be brought to bear upon their vicious, militant elements and consequent immoral tendencies. It is not unrequited, to hear the most zealous devotees to these measures, express the greatest horror and alarm, at consolidation, and consequent despotism; whereas, a very little reflection, ought to convince every man of sound mind, that they are precisely the same thing, clothed in different garbs, and called by different names. What constitutes the difference between a federal and a consolidated government! It consists simply in this:—A federal government confines its jurisdiction strictly to general and external objects.—A consolidated government, includes within its jurisdiction, not only general and external objects, but all objects of internal concerns. Of which description of objects, are the tariff and internal improvement acts—especially when the tariff acts assume the character of protecting, internal industry, and directing the internal occupations of individuals! Most certainly, these are objects of internal jurisdiction; and the government which exercises jurisdiction over them, as well as over all general and internal objects, must be a consolidated government, in all its essential, practical characteristics, whatever be the nomenclature affixed to it. The writer believes there exists but one opinion, as to the ultimate effects of a consolidated government in the United States—that it must produce despotism, and destroy free-

dom. Under this view of the subject, it is evident, that the general government, as now administered, is exercising jurisdiction over internal, as well as general and external concerns, in a consolidated government—in fact, already a despotism; and time is only wanted, to satisfy every one, when it is too late, of its despotic character. Directing and controlling the property, capabilities, and talents, of individuals, instead of leaving them to the control of their owners, is the very essence of despotism; and this is the identical ground assumed by Messrs. Adams, Clay, and Rush, in justification of the tariff acts. Believing, then, that the union is put in jeopardy, by the various and complicated usurpations assumed in practice, by the general government, the writer thinks, the time is come, when it is the duty of every lover of the consequences of disunion, so that the people of the U. S. might be enabled to judge for themselves, as to the choice they must necessarily make between disunion, with all its hazards, and a consolidated despotism, with all its inevitable, deplorable certainties. If the usurpations of the general government be continued, to this issue we must come at last; and when we do, the writer most earnestly hopes and trusts, with Mr. Jefferson, that there can be neither doubt nor hesitation. The choice must be, between disunion with liberty—and consolidated despotism with slavery.—As regards the relations of the U. S. in their present condition with foreign nations, it is self-evident, that it must be the same throughout the whole—being, in that respect, one government; and of course, all parts must participate equally in the same foreign relations—but very different will be these relations with the different states, in case of disunion. To present this important subject in a clear point of view, it will be necessary to examine the natural relations of different sections of the U. S. towards each other; and with the foreign; commercial nations, growing out of their different productions and occupations. Let, then, the six New England states, including Vermont, be presumed to constitute one confederacy, in case of disunion. What, then, would be the relations of those confederated states, separated from all the rest, with the commercial nations of Europe?—particularly with Great Britain, whose immediate relations to these states, whether united or disunited, must be more important, than the commercial relations with the other European nations, arising from her great ascendancy over all other nations, both in regard to her naval power, and her commercial capital!—This section of the U. S. would present the relation of rivalry, with all commercial foreign nations, particularly with Great Britain with scarcely one single natural tie of mutual accommodation. They are strictly rivals in almost all their relations—in commerce—in navigation—in fishing—and in manufactures—while the only subject of commercial accommodation, would consist in their supplies of live-stock, and some other notions for the West India Market. It is presumed, that the whole amount of agricultural products exported from those states, would not amount to \$2,000,000 out of an export from the whole U. S. exceeding \$50,000,000. Hence, it is evident, that these states, in their natural condition, are necessarily and essentially rivals; and can never, by any artificial means, which would not be ruinous to both parties, become customers of the commercial nations of Europe. Rivalship is a state of hostility, not of friendship; hence little or no advantageous connection could take place between those states, and any one of the commercial nations of Europe; and so far, they might be said to be independent of those nations—that this boasted, positive independence, would add very little to the wealth and prosperity of these positively independent states. New York and New Jersey might form another confederacy, or it might include Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland. In either case, the actual relationship between those states, and the commercial states of Europe, would be nearly the same. New-York is, at present, an Empire in herself—but much of her greatness is artificial, not intrinsic. The great commercial city of New York, and the twenty-five millions of bank capital depend upon contingencies, not upon intrinsic, paramount causes—and her intrinsic resources, or her native productions for exportation, will be found not to be much greater, than those of New England—the only addition to them, of importance, consists of bread-stuffs; and these are so highly valued in Great Britain, as to amount, in ordinary times, to a prohibition, and they are not wanted, in the other commercial nations of Europe. The same rivalry will apply to the whole of the other states, thrown into this confederacy. The whole of these states are the rivals, and cannot be made the customers of the commercial states of Europe—and hence, in case of forming this confederacy out of the separation of the present United States, these states must, in the fixed, unalterable nature of things become rivals and not customers of the commercial states of Europe; and out of this rivalry must, necessarily, come hostility—not friendship. The cities of New York and Philadelphia, particularly New York, present the most powerful and alarming rivals to London and Liverpool in the whole world; and so far from Great Britain cherishing any disposition to foster and increase the wealth and prosperity of either of these cities, particularly of New York, she would be delighted in being afforded an opportunity of prostrating her most formidable rivals, and even laying the city of N. Y. in ashes. N. Y. therefore would have more to dread in case of disunion, than any state in the Union; especially when, independently of the effect of stripping her of all her artificial resources, arising from her present connection with the Southern States, and casting her upon her own means, she would become placed in a hostile attitude with G. Britain—with her great city exposed to British power on the water, and with her North-Eastern frontiers open to attacks from Great Britain, through Canada—now containing a population exceeding half a million of souls, and rapidly increasing both in strength and population—her fortifications strengthened every day. New York therefore without the possibility of gaining any thing, would be

placed in greater jeopardy, by disunion, than any other state in the Union. The whole confederacy for exportation, would fall short of \$6,000,000, whilst their points of rivalry, with the commercial nations of Europe, would be little less than those of the New England States.—These states, then, in the unalterable nature of things in the event of disunion, must become the rivals, not the customers, of all other commercial nations. But it is difficult to say whether more relatively dependent upon, or independent of them; but certainly without any increase of wealth and prosperity arising from the direct and extensive rivalry. The Western States, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, might form a separate confederacy. From their remote position they would have very little connection with the commercial nations of Europe; but to its extent, it would be rather that of mutual accommodation than rivalry, and so far their relation would be friendly rather than hostile. The strange notion of the Western States rivaling the manufacturing nations of Europe, particularly G. Britain, is most absurd and preposterous, and would be ridiculous in the extreme, if it had not already been used to bring about the tariff, with all its horrible effects. The notion of rivaling a nation in manufacturing, in which there is a perfect division of labor, and in which the operatives are content to labor all day and all night too, if necessary; and whether content or not, are compelled to perform this labor without sufficient bread or covering, by another nation, in which the operatives are not only perfectly free from all restraints—demand high wages, abundance of food—and, moreover, the real governors of the nation, are extravagant, nonsensical, and preposterous. Whenever the operatives are permitted to vote under the blessed influence of general suffrage, they of course become the governors of the nation, and, thus they become absolutely incapacitated for successfully rivaling operatives, not blessed with the same great privilege of the elective franchise. The time necessarily required to qualify an operative for performing this great governmental duty, by meetings at barbecues, listening to electioneering orations and enlightening their own minds with due portions of whiskey for that purpose, would alone render the voters the most unsuccessful rivals of operatives, who are relieved from all governmental cares and duties, without sufficient bread or covering, and who are willing to labor, all day and all night—and in the course of that labor, without permitting their minds to wander into governmental cogitations, but to keep them perpetually confined to one single conception, and their bodies to one single physical action, for the perfection of their mechanical art, be it what it may.—Mr. Clay's electioneering, barbecue orations alone, would call for more time from the operative voters under the general suffrage provisions, than would throw them far in the back ground in their rivalry with the British operatives. The writer deems the business of manufacturing for exportation in rivalry with European manufactures in foreign markets, absolutely incompatible with the right of general suffrage, wherever that right may be executed—whether in Massachusetts, Kentucky, or elsewhere; and this consideration alone ought to have determined the tariff-schemers from the wild attempt to form a competition with British manufactures in foreign markets: for surely, nothing can be more unwise, as well as unjust, than buying a foreign market by bounties, drawn from other occupations. From all these considerations, the writer thinks, that the W. States, composing this supposed confederacy, having but little connection, and no rivalry with foreign nations, would have very little dependence upon them; and may be considered quite independent of them, but not a whit the better, nor the wiser, nor the wealthier, nor the happier, from the absence of all connection with the commercial nations of Europe.—Very far different would be the relations between the States composing the Southern supposed confederacy, consisting of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Louisiana, Florida, Georgia, S. and N. Carolinas and Virginia; and the commercial States of Europe. These States present no points of rivalry whatever with the commercial States of Europe; but are the best customers they have in the world—whilst they have no taste for manufacturing except household manufactures, and but little disposition for commerce and navigation; their native productions consist precisely of the materials, in most demand, in other commercial countries—cotton, bread-stuff, rice and tobacco. These states, therefore, are the best customers of the commercial nations of Europe, without any one material point of rivalry; of course, all their relations are friendly, none hostile; and whilst the native productions of these states are much wanted by all the commercial manufacturing nations of Europe, their manufactured goods are much wanted in those States; hence the relations between them consist in mutual accommodations and mutual interests. The writer thinks this relationship of mutual accommodation and interest might produce a mutual dependence between these States and the commercial States of Europe, particularly Great Britain; but this mutual dependence, would necessarily be attended with a mutual, relative independence, which is the most desirable relation that can exist between foreign nations. Out of \$50,000,000 exports from the whole U. S. in 1828, cotton alone produced nearly \$9,000,000. Add, then, the productions of bread-stuff, rice and tobacco and at least \$40,000,000 out of \$50,000,000 will be found to be produced by the exports from these states alone; and this great relative amount would have been, and now would be, much enhanced, if British manufactured goods were freely taken as exchange for consumption here. This measure would be as much to the true interest of these states, as of Great Britain. This statement is made in general terms; but the proportions of the products of the exports, will be found sufficient for coming to the great general results. Those who choose to make more minute calculations, may do so, by turning to the treasury reports of 1828—from which this outline view in round numbers is taken.—Several most instructive

lessons may be learned from these facts. 1st. It will most clearly appear, that in the event of disunion, these states would be placed in the most friendly relations with the commercial nations of Europe, grounded upon the best possible basis—that of mutual accommodation and interest, whilst the Northern and Eastern sections of the U. S. would be placed in a state of unalterable rivalry, and of course, of hostility; and therefore, in the event of disunion, that the Southern States would have nothing to fear from the hostile spirit of Europe, whilst the Northern and Eastern section of the Union would have to encounter all the hostilities arising from jealous rivalships, fixed in the nature of things, and, therefore, unalterable by artificial expedients. Another lesson equally instructive will be found in the relations which must necessarily arise between these different sections of the present union, in the event of separation. It is admitted as an universal truth amongst commercial nations, that the annual imports of every nation will always be nearly equal to its exports. Hence, the Southern States must import into the U. S. or, by other words, the imports into the U. S. grounded upon the exports from these States, must be equal to \$40,000,000, whilst the imports grounded upon the exports from all the U. S. do not much exceed \$50,000,000; it must, therefore, irresistibly follow, that during the existing union, the Southern States contribute four-fifths of the whole revenue, besides the contributions they pay to the manufactures under the tariff acts. The amount then paid is enormous; but the writer has no means at this time to make an accurate estimation thereof—whilst out of this enormous amount of contributions, a very small portion thereof is returned to the contributing States. In the event of disunion, the Northern and Eastern States would be stripped of all participation in these contributions, and left to their own resources, which they will find meagre enough, whenever the trial shall be made; and hence it is rendered evident, that disunion would not be found equally disastrous, to every State in the Union. In that event, the Southern States would be left to the enjoyment of all the good things their God has given them, and to which, they have superadded their own labor; the proceeds of which are now transferred to the Northern and Eastern States for their enjoyment. This singular and unjust effort is produced by the tariff and other artificial, legislative contrivances. Whenever the amount contributed through these means shall become perfectly ascertained, and their unequal distributions known, then either the tariff must be put down to a simple revenue system, or this union must be dissolved. No people, possessing common sense enough to understand the enormous amount obtained from them, through the tariff and other artificial expedients, and common courage enough to defend their rights, will ever long submit to such an unnatural and unprincipled state of things. The writer is well aware, that the Southern people have been often threatened with the superior physical force of the other parts of the U. S. Mr. Clay most significantly reminds the Southern, that the proportion of physical force is as 8,000,000 to 2,000,000 whilst the productive means of the Southern are as 4 to 1 in their favor.—This may be true in regard to physical force as a result from the census of the whole people of the U. S. but it is not true, in relation to the object for which the threat was made. That is, in plain English, for coercing the Southern into a submission to the tariff acts; for the forcible plunder of the Southern people. In a deplorable, wicked purpose of the kind, the people of the U. S. would not be the only people consulted on the occasion. No coercive expedient could be resorted to by the people of one part of the U. S. against another, without calling into action the people of Europe—and on which side would they be found?—Sincerely on the side of their interest. On which side is that? On the side of their rivals?—or the side of their customers? And who would have the money to pay them? The section which exports \$40,000,000 or that which exports \$10,000,000? The author of Union most justly says: "Once divided, we should form stronger bonds of Union with foreign Nations, than with one another." Most certainly we should; and who possesses the means of uniting to advantage in those stronger bonds? Certainly the Southern sections; not only through commercial means, but money means—40,000,000 to 10,000,000 money is truly said to be the snail of war itself. Money is power—and can easily be converted into physical power. The Southern people, therefore, have no cause to be intimidated by these threats. In case of disunion, the Northern and Eastern people would become much more harmless, when kept to themselves, than they are with Union, enjoying all the aids they now get from their connection with the Southern people. What would become of the Northern and Eastern people, if cut off from all commercial relations with the Southern people? What would become of their manufacturing industry, so far as cotton is employed as an essential fabric—and so long as their manufactured goods should be excluded from the Southern market?—Notwithstanding the Southern people have so little to fear, and so much to gain from disunion, comparatively with the Northern and Eastern people, the writer would most sincerely deprecate such an event; but he has no hesitation in saying, he would infinitely prefer disunion, with all its hazards, to the Tariff Acts; which he sincerely believes, imposes upon him an unprincipled, degrading tribute. He would prefer any calamity, to the condition of a tributary slave. Turning and twisting the Tariff Acts in every possible way to avoid it, they must be brought to it at last; and whenever their real effects, shall come to be universally understood, it is possible that freemen should tolerate them? There are other most important and instructive views, which may be hereafter taken of this deeply interesting subject—particularly as to the ground upon which Union ought to be preferred to Disunion, so long as the Constitution is observed, in the practical administration of the Government, and its great original principles, generally, and equality amongst all the several States in the Union, strictly regarded. The writer has sketched out this number too rapidly, for its importance.