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STATE RIGHTS

MR. LEGARE'S SPEECH,

Before the committee of the whole on Mr. Preston's resolutions in the Legislature of South-Carolina, December 15, 1825.

[CONCLUDED.]

He would add some remarks which had weight with him. And first with respect to what had been thrown out, in the preamble of his late colleague, (Mr. Preston) as to the imputation on the Supreme Court, which he thought such a proceeding would imply. Mr. L. said no one could entertain a more profound respect than he did for the individuals who composed that eminent judicatory, but it was impossible they should not be somewhat, however unconsciously, biassed in favor of the particular set of opinions which would naturally be most congenial to the feelings arising out of their relation to the federal government. This was only saying that they were men, and every one knew—every professional gentleman had experienced, how great an effect the slightest leaning or prepossession had even upon the soundest understandings in such refined questions. Indeed, he had the highest authority for saying so—the chief justice himself, who was as much distinguished for candor and fairness, as for his great abilities as a judge, had said on one occasion, of Sir W. Scott, that however he might be disposed to bow to the authority of that illustrious interpreter of the law of nations, it was impossible not to perceive that his mind leaned strongly in favor of the captors. (c) Mr. Legare agreed that the decisions of Sir W. Scott were open to that observation, and he thought, considering his situation in an English Prize Court, it would have been a singular case if it had not been so.

But, without disputing the integrity, the ability or the impartiality of the Supreme Court—or even admitting the possibility that they should lean towards the rights of the states, he said, he did not perceive how, consistently with what they had already decided, they could relieve the states in many cases where the spirit of the constitution would be grossly violated. They had determined in the case of Fletcher, vs. Peck, (6 Cranch) that they could look no further than the law, and the power of the lawgiver, to enact it under *any* circumstances, and that they had nothing to do with his motives. And in the case of M'Culloch, they had ruled, that where any measure was adopted by Congress, there were only two questions that could possibly arise on it in a Court of Justice: 1st. Did it come within its *express* powers, or 2d. Was it a *means* of executing any of its express powers, And if it were shown to be, in the nature of things, a suitable means of executing *any* of its powers, under any circumstances, or for the attainment of *any* of its objects, a Court of Justice would be compelled to give it its sanction, all considerations of expediency, or justice, or the spirit of the constitution, &c. being matter of legislative discretion, not of legal adjudication. It was thus that a written constitution was made to extend the very powers it was intended to limit and restrain. He said he would put the case of the tariff law. He thought that law inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution, to say no more. Let it be admitted, for the sake of the argument, that it was so; he asked how could the Supreme Court say that it was? Wherein was it unconstitutional? As being designed for the encouragement of domestic industry, &c. but it purported merely to be a revenue act—how then could the Supreme Court which was confined to the face of the law itself—which regarded all questions concerning the powers of the federal government as matters *stricti juris*, whenever, at least, that the powers were attempted to be *restrained*—pronounce such a measure unconstitutional? For his part, he never could agree to consider the compact on which the federal union is founded, as that court had always considered it. If the brevity and generality of the constitution, made it sometimes *necessary* to extend the powers of the government by implication, it made it at all times *easy* to do so, and he did not hesitate to say that, according to the canons of interpretation most approved by our leading politicians, there is nothing which may not be brought within the sweep of federal legislation.

In addition to these considerations, Mr. L. said, it was admitted in the federalist to be an anomaly, that controversies arising between two powers, should be decided by a tribunal of the creation, and under the influence of one of those powers. The judicial arrangements made by the constitution, were only submitted to as the lesser of two evils, as for all *ordinary* purposes, they undoubtedly are. But to suppose, that in case of a violation of the constitution by Congress, in relation to any great power, or any important interest, the states should so entirely and submissively acquiesce under the opinion of the Supreme Court, as gentlemen thought they were bound to do, was to suppose that those states had no rights as independent sovereignties, or to apply to whole communities, in their capacity of organized bodies politic, the same rules that obtain in regard to individuals, as citizens or subjects of a particular commonwealth. The individual was bound, or rather compelled to submit to a rule of law, or a decree of a court, however unjust, and although it might occasion his ruin, because it was better, said the law, that a private injury be suffered, than a public inconvenience. But that principle does not apply to the case of states—*status pro ratione voluntas* is, and must be the maxim there, and strong necessity has ever been accounted as sufficient excuse even for manifest violations of law, much more for a resistance, and that too by peaceable means, to acts of usurpation and injustice.

And finally, Mr. L. said, a great objection to the manner of considering these subjects, which prevailed universally among those who maintained the opinions he was combatting, was, that it was not *practical*—that they treated the matter of government as lawyers did a deed, with only one difference, viz: that they admitted the most strained and far-fetched *implications* in favor of their own opinions, and that they seemed to think that the great concern of political society, and the exercise and operation of the mighty powers confided to governments, could be adjusted with perfect precision, and settled with an unalterable stability and firmness merely by means of a written instrument, like the constitution of the U. States. They seemed to imagine there was something mystical and cabalistic in the very tablets it was inscribed upon. They forgot, entirely, that the world is governed "by influence," and that public opinion overrules and supersedes all law. For his part, he had not that faith, either in the permanency or the efficacy of written constitutions and of written laws. The common line, *Legestine moribus vana*, was full of truth and wisdom. No definition, however precise; no promulgation, however solemn; no skill, however curious, in arranging the machinery of checks and balances—in short, no parchment barriers and limits to power whatever, could have much practical effect. The tablets of the law might remain unefficed, unchanged—but though the letter were the same, the meaning might be corrupted—it would be a body preserved, after the spirit that once animated and informed it, had fled. How was the law to be understood by the people? As the courts expound it, say gentlemen, and so, the *constructions* of the court, were after all the law itself, for it must be admitted that it came to that in effect. Now, there was no means of extending the powers of a government half so effectual as a tribunal to expound the constitution in its favor, and to sanctify and seal its acts, with whatever was venerable and imposing in the name and the forms and authority of law. There was something in the adherence to precedents, and the extending the rule by the case, which was exceedingly favorable to the silent progress, and ultimately to the firm establishment of an opinion or a system. The argument of a lawyer is, that whatever has been done and acquiesced in, is good law. So that one error naturally engenders another—one act of usurpation becomes at once the origin and the justification of a thousand more. This opinion was confirmed by the history of some of the most momentous revolutions that had ever occurred in the political opinions of mankind. What was the remedy? The intelligence of the people, the diffusion of knowledge, the frequency of public discussion upon fundamental doctrines. Governments ought, according to a saying of the first of political writers, Machiavelli, which had become a maxim among statesmen, to be frequently brought back to their first principles. How was this to be done? By watchfulness, by jealousy, by distrust, and again by public discussion. Indeed, he thought the main, if not the only advantage of a written constitution, was, that being more precise, and if he might say so, more *compact*, than a body of unwritten law, every particular act of usurpation, every nascent and inchoate violation of its principles, was more readily suspected, and exposed than if they lay hidden in the darkness, or were lost in the indefinite and interminable vagueness of what is called common law. To apply this reasoning to a case; suppose the new argument on internal improvement, he meant that which justified an unlimited appropriation of money, merely as money, to that purpose, turned, as it already had been in some parts of the United States in a certain other direction—and Congress to act upon it—and the states to resist, as resist they must, and should, and would. What would be said some half century hence supposing things to go on in their present train? You are resisting what is just as constitutional, as, what you have before over and over again submitted to; and you are rebels and traitors—and he had no doubt such language would ere long find an echo in many a mind that is not yet prepared to admit its correctness. All this appeared to him plain and simple enough to recommend itself, without the support of any authority, to the common sense of mankind—but he would now cite them a passage of the federalist from which it would clearly appear, that not only were such remonstrances of state legislatures anticipated—not only not spoken of in the language of disapprobation, but actually pointed out as a natural corrective—*the vis medicatrix* of the government—as a means on which the people might securely rely for preventing the encroachments of the federal authorities. (Here Mr L. read the passage of the federalist vol. I. p. 328.) This passage of the federalist was equally strong and explicit—there was no mistaking its meaning, there was no resisting its force, and nothing appeared to him more unquestionable than the wisdom and good sense of the views it implied of the checks—not on *paper* but in *fact* and of *practice*—necessary to the harmonious and well balanced operation of a federative system, so immense as ours. To conclude the argument on this head; he said it was manifest from principles—it was conformable to the conduct of the Colonial Assemblies of this country—it had been taken for granted in the uniform practice of the Legislatures since the adoption of the constitution; and had produced the memorable revolution of 1801—it was necessary to the well being of such a government—it was essential to every idea of liberty—that the Representatives of the people of the states, should possess and exercise whenever there was any occasion, the right which gentlemen denied them.

But, said they, what is the occasion now? What has been done? How could those questions be asked after the president's message had been laid on their tables? Was there one of the great purposes of civil society that had not been claimed in that paper, as among the constitutional objects of federal legislation, and the proper objects of an enlightened policy? And, besides, had not Congress implicitly decided the *principle*, at least, fully discussed it, when it passed what was called and very justly called, the internal improvement bill? And had not the celebrated argument of his friend, Mr. M'Duffie, been considered as decisive of that question—an argument which not only went to settle the principle of that measure, but Mr. L. thought, of as many more of the same, or of any other kind as it should please Congress in its wisdom to undertake?

In proceeding to consider this second part of the subject, Mr. Legare remarked, that he thought in the present state of the controversy concerning the power of Congress to undertake a grand system of internal improvement, the only argument that was worth answering was the very ingenious and striking one he had just mentioned. As for the attempts that had been made to deduce that power as a consequence from the right of declaring war, and establishing post-roads, &c. he could scarcely bring himself to think that its advocates were serious when they advanced such a proposition. Because it would be conceded that in an extreme case—in a case of inevitable necessity—a road might be opened for the passage of an army, or for conveying the mail, (for he was willing to allow that such things might fairly be done, and he had no relish whatever for the verbal criticism as to the difference between "making" and "*establishing*," &c. &c.) could it be gravely pretended that the government of the United States had a right to change its essential character, to engage in the pursuit of entirely new objects, to add to its administration a department unknown to, and inconsistent with, its original organization, he meant that of "*the interior*"—in short, to do whatever a liberal policy might point out as conducive to the prosperity of the whole? Military canals for commercial purposes! A grand scheme of internal improvements by post-roads! Was there ever such an abuse of language, he would not say such an insult upon the common sense of mankind?

He thought as little of the attempt to deduce the power in question from the right to regulate commerce, and the practice of building light-houses, and of providing beacons and buoys for the preservation of ships on a dangerous coast.

But the argument, originally hinted, rather than urged, by Alexander Hamilton, and lately presented to the public, in a most captivating and imposing form, that Congress has a right to appropriate money, merely as money, to any objects it may deem conducive to "the common defence and general welfare," was of a very different character. He had never known one more triumphant in its results, and although he had himself always regarded it as unsound, he would not undertake to say that he should be successful in exposing the fallacy of it in a manner that would be equally satisfactory to others.

This argument, he said, was that the government needed no distinct, specific power for the execution of these projects, inasmuch as it would not take part in them as a political sovereignty, but on the same footing as private individuals, viz: by contributing the fund necessary to accomplish them. These funds, it was contended, it had an undoubted and unlimited right to raise by any sort of taxation; and when once raised, to appropriate to whatever objects it should deem most conducive to the general welfare. It was conceded, however, and Mr. L. said, the concession was a very important one, that these objects ought to be "*national*" in contradistinction to some—he could not say exactly what—that were not national. But on the other hand, it was contended that the words "common defence and general welfare," which rendered it necessary to make that concession, were *restrictive* of what would otherwise have been wholly unlimited—to wit, the power of levying taxes, and disposing of revenue.

To begin with the sweeping proposition, that Congress had a right, or as gentlemen would rather express it, *power*, to levy taxes upon the people for any purpose whatsoever, or for no purpose at all, and out of sheer wantonness and caprice. If they confounded power with impunity, or regarded a power to evade and to violate the constitution, without being liable to have its acts defeated and annulled by a court of justice, as a power to execute the purposes of the constitution, the paradox would be indeed explained, although certainly not established, for the Supreme Court, as has already been shewn, would probably be under the necessity of ratifying any measure of the kind alluded to. But in his way of considering these subjects—which suited a man not very long, because not very capable of refining, especially in matters of such a practical nature—not only the government of the United States—which is a very limited government—but no other government—no functionary—no trustee, could properly be said to have a power to do what was a violation of the true spirit and intent of his authority and instructions. Take the very case in question. Admit for a moment that Congress has an unlimited power to tax the people of the United States for the accomplishment of *bona fide national* purposes—would it have a right to abuse that power, because it was unlimited, and divert it to other ends? Are not the *objects* of a trust an essential part of it, and, as between the agent and his constituents, was it ever heard of in a court of equity—was it consistent with any notion of justice, or any principle of common sense, that a power to raise and dispose of whatever sum of money might be necessary to effect a certain specified purpose, would authorise the appropriation of the fund to quite a different, perhaps an opposite purpose? It followed, therefore, that the friends of internal improvement were not advanced one jot in the argument, even by the hypothetical concession, that Congress does posess the unqualified and despotic right of taxation which they claimed for it.

But, Mr. L. said, he denied that Congress or that any other government possessed any such right; at least to the extent to which gentlemen wished to push it. Taxation was one of the highest attributes of sovereignty—one of those transcendental prerogatives, with which a body politic, was invested for promoting the great interests of the community, at whatever expense to the interest of the individual. It was a consequence of what publicists calle the *eminet domain*; that is to say, in plain English, the will of the majority and the right of the strongest—it was, as had been said before, taking away from the citizen a part of his property, and appropriating it to public purposes, and nothing could justify that in any case, but necessity of great and manifest utility. And even with this qualification, it was a power at once of such vast importance, and so easily misapplied and abused, that in all free countries it was laid under the greatest restraints, and watched with a most jealous vigilance. Arbitrary taxation had occasioned most of the political revolution of modern times, from Magna Charta down to the declaration of American independence, and nothing surprised him more than to hear it talked of, in the country of all others, as a thing of course—a matter of no sort of moment—a postulate to be assumed in any speculation—a conceded right and an elementary principle. Gentlemen spoke of taxing the people to their last shilling, as if it was perfectly in the order of society to do so, and as if any thing could justify such a measure, (such a measure could be imagined) but a necessity which would supersede all law, and imply a dissolution of the whole frame and constitution of a government. He ventured to say, that the Grand Turk would be obliged to them to preach to his subjects into their good creed, for he believed that it was in these matters, if any where, that despotism was compelled, to truck and barter, as Burke had expressed it, and in some of the dominions of that barbarous autocrat, the head of a reject was less protected than his purse.

If any thing, then, was to be made of the clause of the constitution under consideration, it would be because the words "general welfare" *enlarged* the grant of power to raise money by taxation. Suppose those words had not been there, and the power to levy taxes had been given without any specification of the objects to which they should be applied, what had been the consequence? It would have been universally admitted, he supposed, that taxes could, in that case, have been laid and collected only to effect the great ends of the Union in conformity with the grants of power that were made in other parts of the constitution. Yet, it is clear that Congress would have had a right to raise money in that way, to pay the debts of the United States, and to provide for the common defence and general welfare, which it would of course do, by executing its whole trusts, and performing *all* its duties: for what was the very end and object of the confederation but to promote the common defence and general welfare? But *expressio eorum que tacite insunt nihil operatur*; and so those wonder working words seemed to him to be, after all, mere surplusage.

His friend, however, had taken a very different view of this subject. Proceeding on the erroneous supposition, that an unlimited power to do one thing, amounted to an unlimited power to do *any* thing, and that the *means* of raising money by taxation, had no connexion with the *ends* it was intended to accomplish, at least bore no proportion of them in extent, he regarded the words "*general welfare*" as restrictive of an otherwise unlimited grant, as an exception that proved the rule. Then, in return for a concession so liberal and unexpected, he only claimed to make the most of the poor remnant of power which his scrupulous justice had left him. In short, his friend's position was, that while all *other* means necessary and proper for executing the enumerated powers of the federal government, were limited by the nature of those powers, the levying and disposing of money, the universal means, was restrained only by this condition, that it should not be thrown into the sea, or bestowed upon individuals who had no claim on the public, &c. but should be fairly laid out in any way that would contribute to promote the general welfare.

As to the idea that these words were restrictive, he thought it clear, as had already been remarked, that were they obliterated, it would neither increase nor diminish the power of Congress, to raise as much money by taxation as might be necessary for the purposes of the Union—but, in fact, the argument on the other side, involved a palpable inconsistency, which had struck him at the first view of it, and which he had pointed out to his friend in a conversation they had had on the subject. It was admitted by the advocates of the system, that they had no right, under that *narrow* phrase "general welfare," to appropriate money to *particular* or private objects which the high prerogatives of a government of a very limited extent and of enumerated powers, would otherwise, it seems, have enabled them to do! They owned that the treasury of the nation, the copartnership fund, was fairly liable only for *national* debts and contracts. Now, Mr. Legare said he would be glad that those who were so fond of settling principles and working by system, would be obliging enough to define what *they* meant by a *national* object. He knew what the author of the argument he was endeavouring to refute, meant by it. He had heard him say that there were very few undertakings of the kind, that he would consider as entitled to that appellation. But the question was, not what he wished to prove, but what his argument in fact proves, if it proves any thing at all. The notion was, that the power of appropriating money, was not limited to those cases to which it is necessary as a means of executing any of the other powers of the government, (as Mr. B. conceived it to be;) but that it went beyond that, and yet was not altogether indefinite and circumscribed. Within what imaginary limits—within what ideal zone, its orbit was to be confined, was the problem which he though it so difficult to solve. According to his theory, those were national objects which the Constitution had conferred upon Congress power to accomplish—which the states had covenanted with each other to accomplish as a *nation*, with unity of purpose, of means and of interest. As to war and peace, for example, they might be said to be consolidated, and accordingly every preparation and instrument of war, of what description or of what degree of importance soever was a strictly national object. The most paltry, distant, and isolated fort from the frontiers, was as much a matter of common defence, as the whole navy, or the whole army. Why? Because every State is equally interested in preventing evils, which all are equally bound to encounter and to sustain—because it is one of those particulars, in which they are inseparably joined together by "mutual league, united thoughts and counsels, equal hope, and hazard in the glorious enterprize." But when he heard certain object called national, which did not come within the enumeration made in the covenant of the Union—which were over and above these as to which these independent States had agreed to consider themselves as one nation, Mr. Legare owned, he did not apprehend the meaning of the term.

He knew it would be replied, that the works alluded to, although not coming within the scope of any of the enumerated powers of Congress, and so not strictly national in their character, would yet become so *by their effects*, under that particular clause, provided they were fairly calculated to promote the "general welfare." Thus a canal uniting two great sections of the country and benefiting *many* States, although it was not a work that directly interested the nation as a nation, still from its great importance might deserve the appellation of national. But that notion, he said, led immediately to a conclusion contrary to the hypothesis. If the question, whether an object was or was not connected with the national or general welfare, was to be decided by reference not to any description in the Constitution, but merely to effects, he asked again, what works would not be national? For instance, if South Carolina would, as a part of this nation be considered as benefited by a canal which should carry the trade of the Western States from her capital, to the Chesapeake Bay, and which would therefore, be extremely injurious to her as a State—if a work of that kind could be called national, *merely in reference to its consequences*, notwithstanding a supposed injury to a part, because the whole country would gain more than that part lost—then the same conclusion must be drawn, wherever the same benefit took place, however local such benefit might appear to be. Thus a canal from the Edisto to the Ashley river might, according to this reasoning, be undertaken by Congress, for as, by a supposition it would be an improvement of one part, and could not possibly hurt any other, the whole would of course gain precisely as much as the improvement was worth. In other words, there is not a creek or a cross road, in any State, that Congress has not a Constitutional power to take under its superintendence and care—a conclusion surely at variance with the condition imposed upon this money appropriating power, even by the most strenuous advocates of the system, but which he defied them, with all their acumen to resist or to evade. He thought this a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole argument. What then was the just referrence? Not that *every* improvement, by partial expenditures of money, is a national object—but that none are, however general the benefits they confer—not if twenty States out of twenty four profit by them, for injustice would be done to those four—not if all the States profit by them, for a violation of the constitution can never become other than voilation of it by any thing *ex post facto* nor does the end, in this, no more than in any other case consecrate the means.

Other considerations of a more practical nature might be added, but Mr. Legare thought that it was enough to have met, and as he hoped refuted the triumphant argument of the friends of the power. He had no doubt but the system would go on—he thought opposition to projects on every account, so dazzling and attractive, would be forever unavailing. But he felt the interest of the South, and especially of South-Carolina too keenly—he was too strongly persuaded that the principles he advocated were absolutely necessary to their prosperity and safety—to surrender at discretion, and submit without a murmur.

(a) *Bl. Comm. V. I. p. 42. Sovereignty and legislation are convertible terms, &c. Ibid 44. Wooddeson's Elements, Sec. III. p. 80.*

(b) *See Ware, vs. Hylton, 3 Dall. 323, per Chase, J. and 3 Dall. 386.*

(c) *4 Dall. 19.*

(d) *Vattel, c. 1, s. 3, and see the remarks of Wooddeson Elem. of Jurisprudence, 86.*

(e) *In the case of the Venus, 8th Cranch, 299.*

From the Richmond Compiler.

MESSRS. EDITORS—I do not know if the following correction of a frequent and common error be worth much; and yet it is always a little better to be right than wrong in almost any thing. The name of the distinguished man who is emphatically styled the Liberator of South-America, is often pronounced, and I hope will long be so with respect and veneration, by every friend of liberty—But it is generally pronounced wrong. It is accented on the *first* syllable, when it should be on the *second*, with the sound of the *i* like *e* long. The correct accent and sound are *Bolesvar*, and not *Bolivar*. The capital of Colombia also is *Bogota*, and the town where the Congress of South-America is now in session, is Panama; both should be accented on the *last* syllable, and the sound of the *a* at the end of them, is like the sound of *a* in *father*.

I saw in some of the public papers, not long since, directions for pronouncing the name of Iturbide. His name is properly pronunced in four syllables—I-tur-bee-de—accent on the last syllable but one, and *i* like *e* long.

GRAMMATICUS.

From the London Times.

SINGULAR CASE OF CRIM. CON.

A *crim. con.* discovered in the titled world, to which we some time since adverted, is shortly expected to provide ample food for the devouring maw of the law. The circumstances of the case are these—The lady is about 23, and her husband on the wrong side of 60. The young lord is just of age, and had, previous to the lady's marriage, paid his addresses to her; in truth, they had been companions from infancy, and the uncle of his lordship had given his consent to their union. The old gentleman, at that period, had never seen his niece that was to be, and curiosity led him to be introduced to her, when, lo and behold! he fell in love with her himself, and immediately offered her his hand! His nephew has only a title and a commission in the guards to depend on; the uncle had a superior title, and sum £30,000 per annum. Difference of age was of no very small importance; the lady's parents prevailed upon her to accept age for youth; and the young lord agreed to relinquish his pretensions for a sum of £10,000 and promised to reside abroad for two years. It appears he had completed the terms of his agreement and come home. The uncle, it seems, did not relish his appearance, and refused to admit him on terms of intimacy into his family. In process of time a son was born to the aged peer; and in the fullness of his pride, he invited his nephew to the christening, and a youthful intimacy was renewed, closer than before. Whispers began to circulate of consequence to the aged peer; it was rumoured that his nephew had been seen hovering around his country seat many months before his lady had presented him with a son and heir, and that on one occasion, when she went to Tunbridge for her health, and resided under the roof of her aunt, lord ——— lodged in the *town* at a milliner's, where they met every day for three months; and had been visible in the fields and lanes by moonlight.

These things set the old man on the alert.—He found, to his sorrow, his *sanctum sanctorum* in P——o square, was invaded nightly by his nephew, who mounted his garden wall by means of a ladder, and was received by the lady's maid and his house steward, who ushered him to the connubial chamber. For what reason is not known, the old gentleman preferred sleeping in a truck bed in his library, to bedding with a young and blooming wife. A plan was put in execution, and his lordship was detected in the lady's bed chamber. He had no arms wherewith to defend himself, and his uncle, assisted by a reverend divine, and a posse of servants proceeded to eject him *vi et armis*, and actually threw him over the banisters of the stairs; he caught hold somewhere about the first landing, and saved his neck. The house steward then supplied him with a poker, and as the uncle descended with his phalanx, to immolate his victim, he levelled the parson by a facer from the poker, and the trusty steward with the butt end of a hunting whip, served the aged peer in the same manner. The lady, now recovering from her fainting fits, rushed down stairs, and a party ensued. The young lord was permitted quietly to depart; and the lady still remains under her husband's roof.

The following verse, stanzas, or whatever else it may be called, is a literal transcript from a tomb-stone in Wigtown Church-yard, in Galloway:

Here lies John Taggart, of honest fame,
Of stature low, and a leg lame;
Content he was, with portion small,
Kept shop in Wigton, and that's all.

London paper.