Hundreds of Miles of Peninsula Lands Mis;ht Be Held and Hostile Hands. The bill for the fortification of the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, which has been ajritated for several years, will in all probability be passed by Congress an this session, and thus the government will be able to guard one of the most important points along the Atlantic Coast. The building of a fort on Cape Henry, directly at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, will give protection to an even more valuable section 01 the country tnan the huge Panama Canal, which is also to be fortified. While the canal will represent a cast outlay of money, .and will be immensely valuable to this nation in the event of war with either a Euro pean or Asiatic country, the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay once entered, would give to the enemy easy access to not only the capital ot the nation, but the cities of Baltimore and Phil adelphia, to say nothing of Annapolis and the Naval Academy and the cit ies of Norfolk, Newport News and the great shipyards and coal- piers represents g millions of dollars in Hampton Roads. Although there is a modern forti fication at Fortress Monroe, and, to a great extent, ships of a foreign navy could be prevented from enter ing the inner Hampton Roads were they to steam in straight from sea. yet should ships get pass Cape Henry it would be possible for them to steam up the Bay toward Baltimore without getting within range of the guns at Monroe. Cape Henry, as will .be shown, is the key to the Chespeake Bay. Un less it is 'fortified in the most thor ough manner it will be vulnerable and an open invitation to an invasion that would be difficult to repel. The possibility of the United States being invaded must, of course, be considered from two main stand points. First, in connection with the vulnerability of our coast line de fenses, and secondly, as to the forces sent against us. At the outset it may be said that no one power could effect a wide spread or permanent invasion, but it may be reasonably feared that one of several large powers might gain control of one or more of our Im potant strategic positions and inflict (great punishment before this nation could pif.ce itself In a condition to drive out the enemy. As to vulnerability, we may scan the situation from Maine to Texas, and thee from Texas on the Pacific side to the northernmost edge of our country, and, though seeing several points (it which a hostile power might Sf>ek to gain a foothold, no part of our entire coast line presents, In the hands of the enemy, such an opportuElty for destuction of great cities as does the Chesapeake Bay, whose geopraphical nature is pecu liarly fe.vorable to baffling aggres siveness and continued occupancy. ? It may confidently be said that the power controling that body of water ???I also ?cnr.?c(, or reader absolute ly useless to this nation, the entire peninsula formed by the Chesapeake Bay, Atlantic Ocean and 'Deleware River, as well as many mi'es of pen-1 i:isula land on the western side of, the Bay At no other part of our coast line, could the transportation of troops and munitions of war be so effectual-' ly hampered, while, conversely, no other part of our coast involves the preservation of so many strategic ad vantages and facilities for the speedy transportation by land and water of an army as would be afforded us by, the control of the Che&a^ake, the] key to which is the entrance ;ormed by Cape Henry and Cape Ch irles, whose natural advantages for resist Tilled ing a hostile fleet lies on the south side, which is washed by the main ship channel whose width abreast of Cape Henry Lighthouse is less than three statute miles between five fathom lines. Cape Henry is the natural Gibral tar of the United State., and should be made impregnable and impassable, the necessity for which obtains be cause iti s the key to our most important of all strategic situations, and because, with trie proper fortifi cation of this point, fewer battleships in the event of war would be here re quired to aid in repelling the enemys fleet. This means not only protec tion to invaluable facilities at the ports of the Chesapeake, the preserva tion to our own and closure to a hos tile fleet of the finest harbor, as yell as the most important base of opera tions we possess, but a virtual in crease in the size and strengin of our navy and its scope and effective ness at other ports of our great coast line. The ports of New York, Boston ana Galveston, representing, as they do, the extreme poles or outlets of our commercial conditions as well as strategic advantages and untoil val uations of property, lie almost within gunshot of the ocean and would re-, quire, in addition to their present de fenses, all the reinforcement they could iget from our "dogs of war." Some idea of the strategic value of the Chepapeake Bay for operaton in case of war may be gleaned from the fact that within its entrance" there are 700 miles of water naviga ble for vessels of 17 or 18 foot draft; 550 miles o;r which are naviga ble for vessels of 20 feet draft; 125 miles for ships drawing 25 feet, and nearly 400 miles which may be trav ersed by ships of ::0 feet draft. Thb 17 or 18 foot channel way admits a small naval fry, such as torpedo boats and destroyers, gun boats and other vessels of light draft. The 20-foot. \S/iecsT Proposed'Hop? depth will accommodate second and third class cruisers and many troop and supply ships. The 25-foot depth will admit of navigation by all sec ond-class battle ships, first class cruisers, scout and troop ships, and in fact all auxiliary craft of a navy; while nearly 400 miles of the Chesa peake and its tributaries may be pen etrated by warships of the Dread naught type clear up to Baltimore. What a scope for the -enemy's fleet land what a national disaster to us? the transportation of troops and munitions of war, through the Chesa peake and the proposed Inland Wa terway cut off; the- deprivation of a great proportion of the nation's fa cilities for docking and repairing, with the lost of the most central of all coaling stations. Deprived of this central base of operations, the ships of our navy would be driven to seek facilities, fuel and shelter in either extreme northern or southern ports. Not only cou'd a hostile fleet with Impunity pass Fortress '.Monroe, but a hundred?five hundred?troopships of the "tramp" class and eggsshell construction could with equal safety pass up the Bay under cover of night or during weather the least hazy or misty. What gunnery or what marksmanship could contest the pas sage of battleships at a distance of twelve and one-half miles, or even I troopships when favored with dark ness or during the day by haze or I mist? 'Baltimore, Norfolk and Newport News are accessible, as far as chan nel accommodations are concerned, to vessels of the Dreadnought type, while the York River may be entered tventy-two miles; the Rappahannock, [thirty; the Potomac, thrty-five, and [ the Patuxent River twentyrailes by ships of the same class, to say noth ing of the streams which empty Into the eastern side of the Bay; while Annapolis may be approached with in a mile or two and the improve I ^ ; i ? I ? ? ? . ' I 0 c? 10 -. ;2.0; ? 30 . : < : ' ?BHEUSHHHHUBHMMHHUflMHflD merits at the Academy, and for which the government has spent millions be utterly demolished. The James, York, Rappahannock, Potomac and Patuxent Rivers, navi gable for distances varying from forty to one hundred miles inland by many large vessels of war, form the four main peninsulas on the western side of the Chesapeake, whose width at the narrowest parts, from channel to channel, ranges from six to nineteen miles. Battleships operating as the first and last named (first above York town and secondly from Patuxent River or Bay) points could, without co-operation of other vessels in con tigious channels, command the two peninsulas formed by the James and York and the Patuxent River and Bay, and the co-operative fire of ships carrying long-range guns, lo cated in our rivers as above outlined, would thoroughly rake across the three peninsulas lying between the Patuxent and York Rivers. The total length of peninsulas commanded by the enemy's fire (adding eight miles for inland range) would be, respectively, twenty-nine and one-half, thirty-two thirty-eight, thirty-one and twenty six miles, or a total command of one hundred and fifty-six and one half miles of these peninsula*. Only reasonable possibilities of strategic disaster are here dealt with, while it is not altogether inconceiv able that vessels of the enemy, cay rying high-power guns, might pen etrate the Potomac and other rivers much farther than has been indl mrrw ^^^^^ ^ cated. In possession of the peninsulas of the Chesapeake, and the landing of a large army, the enemy's position for flank maneuvering would be most advantageous, and the (American army sent to repel them might find itself between the enemy's force on ! land and the "dead lines" across the peninsulas whVJh would be raked by the hostile ships in our rivers. With such a disaster to our present! standing army confronting us, who can say what, devastation might not he wrought or what strategic ad vantages gained by the invading nation? Who can confidently deny the possibilty of not only Baltimore and Washington, but the cities of New York. Boston, Philadelphia and in fact all the ports of the Atlantic SeoL>ard being bid under the ,ban of heavy reprisals?pending the period of army training of raw material? The likelihood of any one nation landing a force sufficient for wide spread or permanent invasion, is of course remote, but it is readily con ceivable that in the first stages of hostilities, suddenly precipitated, our own land forces might suffer an over whelming distaster, while concerted invasion by several powers at this point, would seriously endanger the cities, defenses and facilities of the entire Atlantic and Gulf coast line. The formation of these western peninsulas by the James, York, Rap pahannock, Potomac and Patuxent rivers, but a few miles between them, pre. ents a etartlingly vulnerable point of atack and possible invasion; for here, the enemy, under perfect i h vT I V^'i?~^ iff 0 ?ip > CAPU CffARLES shelter from storms, could make a demonstration of landing on either peninsula,necessitating 'the concentra tion of our forces at such point, while he could, at his pleasure, shift his pcjeiition either northwardly or southwardly, Jand his forces and march against the real point of at tack and create ruin and devastaton while our army would be forced by the hostile ships in our rivers to make a long detour to meet them. Under such circumstances it be comes aparent that a large army of Americans would be required to de fend each peninsula; else we might ask ourselves (with the main strength of our army drawn to d~i fend a feigned point of attack, if New York, Philadelphia, RalMmore. or the National Capitol would be safe? Should it be thought necessary for further protection of the bay, to supplement the fortification at. Cape Henry by additional defense, an is land fort might be built in 14 or 15 feet of water,' north by west and six and one-half miles off Cape Hen ry. This would gfve to the fort at the latter place command over the northern channel "ieat reaches\o point where the ca.ic?:r cells die, but the healthy cells re main uninjured. In this m>ann?r concers of the nose and throat and the surface cancers have been com pletely cured. Such cases are said already to number far up in the hundreds. \ Th? process is said to requ:.re the most minute ordered to be held at the school house in Eutawville district No. C Orangeburg County, South Carolina, on Thursday, June 15, 1911, for the purpose of voting on the question of a special tax of three (3) mills to be used for school purpose in said district. Said election to be con ducted according to section 1208 of the school law. M. B. Dantzler, T. S. Gelzer, T. L. Connor, Jr., ,. ? Trustees. Papa ooked Out For Us, "and that's why mamma doesn't have to work down-town like Benny's mamma does. Poor Benny, his papa didn't take out LIFE INSURANCE. Life Insurance Policy like your papa did; and that's why they are so poor." A little story, but it carries it's own moral. If you want to pro tect your family in case of death we will write a policy you can afford to carry and that will be paid if you die. SEE ZEI6LER & DIBBLE TODAY. Special Agents Equitable Life-Strongest in the World. Notice of Discharge. Notice is hereby given that I will file my final account as Guardian of J. A. Cone with the Judge of Pro bate for the County of Orangeburg on the 30th day of June, 1911, and will on that day a;;k for letters of dis charge as the Guardian of my said ward. f Vernon Brabham, Guardian of J. A. Cope. J f He Left Politics For Love. Anbitlon did not satisfy nor did a guilty conscience make a pleasant companion for solitude. But the love of a woman could do both, so the b ero of "Coniston" began to try to be vorthy of her. Winston Churchill's novel is a great moral lesson, whole some and true. Formerly published at $1.50; now fifty cents Sims'J Book Store. LOUIS COHEN & CO. 232 ad 234 King, and 203 Meeting Streets, Charleston, S. C. THE ARCADE STO? The largest Wholesale and Retail Mail Order house in the South. Write us. Try us on an order. Your near est mail box places our store right next door to you. 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