

The Camden Confederate.

VOLUME I.

CAMDEN, SO. CA., FRIDAY, JUNE 27, 1862.

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The Camden Confederate

IS PUBLISHED EVERY FRIDAY BY
J. T. HERSHMAN,
AT TWO DOLLARS A YEAR,
PAYABLE INVARIABLY HALF-YEARLY IN ADVANCE.

Terms for Advertising:
For one Square—fourteen lines or less—ONE DOLLAR for the first, and FIFTY CENTS for each subsequent insertion.

OBITUARY NOTICES, exceeding one Square, charged for at advertising rates.

Transient Advertisements and Job Work MUST BE PAID FOR IN ADVANCE.

No deduction made, except to our regular advertising patrons.

ADVERTISING TERMS PER ANNUM.

One Square, 3 months,	\$5
" " 6 "	8
" " 12 "	12
Two Squares, 3 months,	8
" " 6 "	13
" " 12 "	18
Three Squares 3 mos.,	12
" " 6 "	18
" " 12 "	25
Four Squares 3 mos.,	16
" " 6 "	24
" " 12 "	30

Eight dollars per annum for every additional square.

BUSINESS, and PROFESSIONAL CARDS EIGHT DOLLARS a-year. All advertisements for less than three months CASH. If the number of insertions is not specified in writing advertisements, will be continued till ordered out, and charged accordingly.

Announcing CANDIDATES, three months, Five Dollars over that time, the usual rates will be charged.

No advertisement, however small, will be considered less than a square; and transient rates charged on all for a less time than three months.

TO TRAVELLERS.

SCHEDULE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA RAIL ROAD.



NORTHERN ROUTE.

STATIONS.	DAY TRAINS.	NIGHT TRAINS.
Leave Charleston.....	7.00 a m	8.15 p m
Arrive at Kingsville, the Junction of the Wilmington & Manchester R. R.	2.45 p m	3.15 a m
Arrive at Columbia.....	4.00 p m	5.00 a m
Arrive at Camden.....	4.40 p m

Leave Camden.....	5.20 a m
Leave Columbia.....	6.15 a m	5.30 p m
Leave Kingsville, the Junction of the Wilmington & Manchester Railroad..	6.45 a m	3.25 p. m
Arrive at Charleston.....	3.00 p m	2.30 a. m.

WESTERN ROUTE.

STATIONS.	DAY TRAINS.	NIGHT TRAINS.
Leave Charleston.....	7.00 a m	6.30 p m
Arrive at Augusta.....	2.45 p m	4.30 p m

Leave Augusta.....	6.00 a m	7.30 p m
Arrive at Charleston.....	3.30 p m	4.30 a m

THROUGH TRAVEL BETWEEN AUGUSTA AND KINGSVILLE

STATIONS.	DAY TRAINS.	NIGHT TRAINS.
Leave Augusta.....	8.00 a m	7.30 p m
Arrive at Kingsville.....	2.45 p m	3.15 a m

Leave Kingsville.....	6.45 a m	8.25 p m
Arrive at Augusta.....	1.15 p m	11.15 p m

MID-DAY TRAIN BETWEEN CAMDEN AND KINGSVILLE,

MONDAY, WEDNESDAY, AND SATURDAY.

DOWN.		UP.	
Leave Camden, 11.40a. m.	Leave Kingsville, 8.5 a. m.	Leave Camden, 11.40a. m.	Leave Kingsville, 8.5 a. m.
Leave Boykin's, 12.12p. m.	Leave Clarkson's, 8.20 "	Leave Boykin's, 12.12p. m.	Leave Clarkson's, 8.20 "
Leave Claremont, 1.248 "	Leave Manchester Junction, 8.38 a. m.	Leave Claremont, 1.248 "	Leave Manchester Junction, 8.38 a. m.
Leave Middleton, 1.10 "	Leave Middleton, 8.43 "	Leave Middleton, 1.10 "	Leave Middleton, 8.43 "
Leave Manchester Junction, 1.18, p. m.	Leave Claremont, 9.08 "	Leave Manchester Junction, 1.18, p. m.	Leave Claremont, 9.08 "
Leave Clarkson's, 1.38 "	Leave Boykin's, 9.48 "	Leave Clarkson's, 1.38 "	Leave Boykin's, 9.48 "
Arrive at Kingsville, 1.50, Nov. 8—14	Arrive at Camden, 10.20	Arrive at Kingsville, 1.50, Nov. 8—14	Arrive at Camden, 10.20

H. T. PEAKE, Gen'l Supt.

Oats and Cow Peas

FOR SALE FOR CASH, AT THE 'OLD CORNER,'
November 1 E. W. BONNEY.

Guano.

TWO TONS PERUVIAN GUANO, ALSO A small lot of Patagonian Guano, for sale by
February 28 E. W. BONNEY.

Seed Oats.

SEED OATS FOR SALE AT THE 'OLD CORNER,' by
February 28 E. W. BONNEY.

[From the London Times, May 19th.]
Mr. Spence on the fall of New Orleans and its effect on the Southern Cause.

To the Editor of the Times:

SIR: The fall of New Orleans cannot but surprise those who have received recent assurances of the ample strength of its defences and the ability of its gunboats and floating batteries to repel any attack. This very confidence seems to have been fatal; for the Southern fleet, or so much of it as rendered the rest powerless, appears to have ascended the river to For Wright, and was therefore 800 miles away when so greatly needed at home. Unquestionably this is the most injurious blow the South has received, and in the present state of affairs it is of interest to ascertain its real proportions and the actual effect it will produce. Prestige is, indeed, of little concern to men who are sacrificing their lives and property to prevent the subjugation of their country, but the material loss is important, the workshops of that city can ill be spared, and this success will reinforce those Northern delusions on which reason had begun to break, and thus will greatly tend to prolong the war.

A serious result, not unlikely to follow in the end, will be the forcing of the entire length of the Mississippi. The supporters of North appear to hold that some very dire result would flow from this. They describe that river as an artery to open which would be fatal to the existence of the Southern cause, or as a great highway for the enemy into the heart of the country. In reality the Southern States consists of two regions—one, lying west of that river, Texas, Arkansas and part of Louisiana, altogether apart from the serious operations of the war. The States which form the actual field of the contest occupy an enormous compact space, a rude square, bounded on two of its sides by the Atlantic and the Gulf; on the other two by the Ohio and the Mississippi.—Hence, the latter, so far from being an arterial stream in the centre of the system, is, as regards this contest, a boundary line, and will simply place the States that lie upon it in the position which those of the east occupy on the ocean. All the large rivers that intersect the country below Cairo run from the west into the Mississippi, and instead of bringing an enemy into the heart of the country, would carry him away from it.

It is true that if a series of years could be devoted to the conquest of the South this river would become invaluable as a road to the various points of departure for the interior. In that view of the case, too, each town occupied would represent a further step in the long reckoning. But in forming a judgment of this war the condition must be kept constantly in view—time and cost. Unless made quickly the conquest can never be made. The patience of Europe, shut out from two-thirds of the American coast, and deprived of materials absolutely essential to its industry, is now becoming exhausted. Whatever the meek resignation we are expected to exhibit, for the fortitude with which our workmen are to smile upon a diet of bread and water, it is very certain this will not long suit the French temperament. In that country hunger is a political question. It is one that was never yet safely trifled with. The politicians of Washington could hardly assume that the Governments of Europe would permit hundreds of thousands of their people to exist in compulsory idleness and want for just so many years as their convenience might dictate. It has been their plea in reply to this, that the time would be short—a few months, 90 days. This is their engagement to Europe, and they must keep it.

The question of costs is of still more certain effect. According to the latest estimate presented to Congress, the North is plunging into debt at the rate of half our national debt per annum. After allowing for all existing income, \$3,000,000 per day, borrowed at 7 per cent interest, will work out that incredible result. No such reckless gambling with the industry of fu-

ture years was ever recorded of any people.—Congress, too, employs itself in framing bills of confiscation to allure and sweeten the return of peace, while the famous Tax Bill, that was to hold out some promise of a provision for payment, appears all but certain to be thrown over the session. By dint of such contrivances as "certificates of indebtedness" and "quartermasters' vouchers" the day of inconvertible paper has been staved off cleverly; but the ultimate effect of these measures will be that, instead of a gradual depreciation, the collapse, when it comes, will be so much the more sudden and violent. The Northerner will smile at this. During the railway mania, those in the excitement of the pursuit smiled complacently upon the few who asserted the hollowness of the bubble. The day came, however, when it burst. Each month brings nearer the inevitable crisis, and the battle must be fought out before that hurricane strikes the ship.

It follows that the events of the present war can only be rightly judged when tested by the standard of their cost in time and money. A blundering player at chess may capture half a dozen pieces, and discover that he has employed himself in losing the game. Taking a broad view of the subject, what is the aspect of the war to-day as compared with its promise on the 1st of March? The issue depends absolutely and entirely, so far as the Northern progress is concerned, on the fate of the main armies in the field. All the minor occurrences at the extremities must follow the fate of decisive events at the centre—the branches must fall as the tree falls. Now, the Eastern campaign opened with an enormous host at Washington, well drilled, admirably equipped, and to all appearance, able to annihilate the weather-beaten forces, thinned by a winter's hardships at Manassas. The Southern army was to be driven out of Virginia as a matter of course. We now approach the end of the spring, and find the great Northern host broken up into pieces. The chief of these is so placed that the enemy might have guided it to take the narrowest road, the sickliest locality, and to run against the very strongest wall it could find. Of the other corps, that of McDowell, still breathes the air of the Potomac, while that of Gen. Banks devotes itself to an incessant march, first to the west then to the south, and now eastwards. Meantime the Southern army, greatly increased in strength and placed in a commanding position, instead of its original inferiority, appears stronger than any force that threatens it, and, so far from being driven out of Virginia, seems very likely to inflict disastrous loss on its assailants. Should the main army of the North return for the third time to Washington, what value will attach to successes on the coast?

Passing to the Western campaign the Federal troops advanced in like manner in overwhelming force. Bowling Green was abandoned, Fort Donelson taken, Nashville occupied: Here, again, the operations commenced with a promise of continuous triumph; yet at the end of two months the army on the Tennessee is employed in recovering from a disastrous blow, and in seeking for further strength, while the weak and scattered forces of the South have become a powerful army, full of spirit, and under a General who alone had acquired a reputation in the field. In the impending contest, should Beauregard gain a victory, the invading troops will be driven out of Tennessee, and a garrison in New Orleans, entirely isolated and exposed to the effects of a summer in that climate, will prove but a very disastrous advantage to the North. And, in considering the aspect of the main Federal operations, it is necessary to keep in view that the real hardships of the war are yet unknown to them. They have travelled, so far, as cabin passengers, and have fought under the wing of gunboats; but before such a country is subdued, many a footsore march must be made to battlefields away from rivers. The commissariat and the hospital services have not yet spoken out.

The truth is, that during the past winter the Northern people, having no external hope, applied themselves to form an army with admirable energy and great success. The Southerners, on the other hand, were thoroughly convinced that the pressure of the blockade and its inefficiency, as reported by all the European consuls to their respective governments, would enforce an intervention of the Great Powers. This conviction lulled them into inaction, especially in the West, and the consequences were plain at the commencement of operations. The delusion passed away, the reality aroused them to action, and we see the result in the relative condition of the main armies. At the end of summer their effective forces will probably be the more numerous of the two. That some positions have been badly held and some mistakes committed can not be surprising. We judge with a European standard, but the half-disciplined troops, whether of the North or South, cannot be expected to operate with the judgment or resist with the firmness of professional soldiers.

Here is a people shut out from the world, deprived of all the comforts of life, starting without tools, money, credit, ships, or soldiers, disappointed in their political calculations, their commerce annihilated, the value of their property extinguished, over matched in men and means of warfare, assailed with torrents of abuse, and depressed by a long course of adverse events. In the face of such difficulties as these they have now 350,000 men under arms, and in the two great actions of the war they have taken home the prisoners and the guns. Is this the scheming of a few ambitious men, or is it the movement of a resolute people? And if such a people are to be subjugated, and such a country is to be held as a conquered province to gratify the ambition or swell the profits of others, for whom are liberty and self-government to be preserved?

But such an event may be regarded as an impossibility. The power of a resolute people against regular armies has often been proved on a small scale—La Vendee, Switzerland, the Tyrol, Holland has exemplified; on a scale such as this, what army, American or European, could deal with it? New Orleans is taken only in name; its trade was gone, and its people unchanged. By a singular fatality its people had no chance to fight for it—a keen humiliation to a race whose courage amounts to recklessness of life. All this will not make them loyal. In every community there will be found some few craven spirits to run up the flag of the conqueror or trade with his sutlers. But in every country the great majority have some respect for the land of their birth, and, whatever their original sentiments, they cannot welcome those who come to rule it as a conquered province. The people of New York are elated, naturally; but they forget the fact that their own city fell into our hands in a manner not more glorious. New York and the Hudson were quite as important to the colonists as New Orleans and the Mississippi are now; yet our possession of them had no effect in subduing the country, and in spite of it the "rebels" obtained their independence. Why may not the same result follow now?

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
Liverpool, May 16.

Notice.

ON AND AFTER THE FIRST DAY OF JANUARY, I will sell no goods on credit. Cash sales only—and invite all those indebted to me to make immediate payment, or failing to do so will find their notes and accounts in the hands of an attorney for collection. Immediate attention to the above is required.
T. S. MYERS.
January 3 3mo

NOTICE

DURING MY ABSENCE FROM THE STATE Mr. Jonathan Page will act as my authorized agent.
April 5 4 W. T. ALLEN.

For Sale.

AN EXCELLENT ONE OR TWO HORSE BUGGY, with top; and also a good DUMPING CART and Gear. Apply at the Bank of Camden.
April 5