

THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN.

Desperate Courage of the Union Troops—
Severe losses on both Sides—
Repulse of the Rebels
across the Rapidan.

From the New York *Tribune* of the 15th, we take the official account of the battle between the rebel forces under Stonewall Jackson and the army of Gen. Pope, which was fought on Saturday, Aug. 9, at Cedar Mountain, Va., about midway between Washington and Richmond. The engagement was one of the most momentous of the war, not merely on account of the desperate valor and unflinching discipline displayed by our troops, the obstinacy of the contest and the heavy loss on both sides, but because of its important effect upon the campaign of which it makes a part. It was an attempt on the part of Jackson to penetrate and recover the Valley of the Shenandoah, whence the richest supplies of the enemy are drawn, and at the same time to threaten Washington and Maryland, so as to relieve Richmond and withdraw our armies again to the line of the Potomac. To secure such objects as these, and knowing that the Government was now relatively weaker, and the rebellion stronger than could again occur in the war, the Richmond leaders sent the flower of the Southern infantry, under their most popular and enterprising generals, a large body of cavalry, under their most distinguished cavalry officer, Maj. Gen. Stuart, and an abundance of artillery. When Jackson had arrived with his forces as far as Louisa Court-house and Gordonsville, and found the disposition of Gen. Pope's troops such that not only his purpose to enter the valley was foiled, but his own direct communications with Richmond were interrupted, he called for further reinforcements, and with those, which were freely furnished, attempted to stem Pope's further advance upon that railroad, the destruction or even the permanent threatening of which must bar from Richmond all hope of the material or political control of Central Virginia.

Jackson attempted, by a feint upon Madison Court-house and Sperryville, to detain our force at the latter point, while at the same time he threw the mass of his forces, numbering 35,000 men, by way of Orange Court-house, upon us at Culpepper, expecting to find only a portion of our forces there, which he could overwhelm, and then march on Sperryville from Culpepper, and crush the army corps of Sigel.

His plans were completely foiled by the rapid concentration of our forces at Culpepper, and their advance to meet him at Cedar Run. After endeavoring in vain to rout and drive Banks' corps, Jackson found himself compelled at night, by the rapid movements in front of him, to fall back to a strong defensive position at Cedar Mountain, and finding his line of retreat growing insecure, in the succeeding night he retreated altogether, retiring beyond Robertson's River and again beyond the Rapidan. The result is Jackson is again foiled, and forced to abandon his operations, and his prestige seriously impaired.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA, {
CEDAR MOUNTAIN, Aug. 13, 1862—5 p. m. }
To Maj. Gen. Halleck, General-in-Chief:

On Thursday morning, the enemy crossed the Rapidan at Barnett's Ford in heavy force, and advanced strong on the road to Culpepper and Madison Court-house. I had established my whole force on the turnpike between Culpepper and Sperryville, ready to concentrate at either place as soon as the enemy's plans were developed.

Early on Friday it became apparent that the move on Madison Court-house was merely a feint to detain the army corps of Gen. Sigel at Sperryville, and that the main attack of the enemy would be at Culpepper, to which place I had thrown forward part of Banks and McDowell's Corps. Brig. Gen. Bayard, with part of the rear of McDowell's Corps, who was in the advance near the Rapidan, fell slowly back, delaying and embarrassing the enemy's advance as far as possible, and capturing some of his men. The forces of Banks and Sigel, and one of the divisions of McDowell's corps, were rapidly concentrated at Culpepper during Friday, and on Friday night, Banks' corps being pushed forward five miles south of Culpepper, with Rickett's division of McDowell's corps three miles in his rear. The corps of Gen. Sigel, which had marched all night, was halted in Culpepper to rest for a few hours.

On Saturday the enemy advanced rapidly to Cedar Mountain, the sides of which they occupied in heavy force. Gen. Banks was instructed to take up his position on the ground occupied by Crawford's Brigade, of his command, which had been thrown out the day previous to observe the enemy's movements. He was directed not to advance beyond that point, and, if attacked by the enemy, to defend his position, and send back timely notice.

It was my desire to have time to give the corps of Gen. Sigel all the rest possible after their forced march, and to bring forward all the forces at my disposal.

The artillery of the enemy was opened early in the afternoon, but he made no advance until nearly 5 o'clock, at which time a few skirmishers were thrown forward on each side under cover of the heavy wood in which his force was concealed. The enemy pushed forward a strong force in the rear of his skirmishers, and Gen. Banks advanced to the attack. The engagement did not fairly open until after 6 o'clock, and for an hour and a half was furious and unceasing. Throughout the cannonading, which at first was desultory and directed mainly against the cavalry, I had continued to receive reports from Gen. Banks that no attack was apprehended, and that no considerable infantry force of the enemy had come forward. Yet, toward evening, the increase in the artillery firing having satisfied me an engagement might be at hand, though the lateness of the hour rendered it unlikely, I ordered Gen. McDowell to advance Rickett's Division to support Gen. Banks, and directed Gen. Sigel to bring his men upon the ground as soon as possible.

I arrived personally on the field at 7 p. m., and found the action raging furiously. The infantry fire was incessant and severe. I found Gen. Banks holding the position he took up early in the morning. His losses were heavy. Rickett's Division was immediately pushed forward and occupied the right of Gen. Banks, the brigades of Crawford and Gordon being directed to change their position from the right and mass themselves in the center. Before this change could be effected it was quite dark, though the artillery fire continued at short range without intermission.

The artillery fire at night by the 2d and 5th Maine batteries, in Rickett's Division, of Gen. McDowell's corps, was most destructive, as was readily observable the next morning in the dead men and horses, and broken gun-carriages of the enemy's batteries which had been advanced against it. Our troops rested on their arms during the night in line of battle, the heavy shelling being kept up on both sides until midnight. At daylight the next morning the enemy fell back two miles from our front, and still higher up the mountain. Our pickets at once advanced and occupied the ground. The fatigue of the troops from long marches and excessive heat made it impossible for either side to resume the action on Sunday. The men were, therefore, allowed to rest and recruit the whole day, our only active operation being of cavalry on the enemy's flank and rear.

Monday was spent in burying the dead and in getting off the wounded. The slaughter was severe on both sides, most of the fighting being hand to hand.

The dead bodies of both armies were found mingled together in masses over the whole ground of the conflict. The burying of the dead was not completed until dark on Monday, the heat being so terrible that severe work was not possible. On Monday night the enemy fled from the field, leaving many of his dead unburied and his wounded on the ground, and along the road to Orange Court House, as will be seen from Gen. Buford's dispatch.

A cavalry and artillery force under Gen. Buford was immediately thrown forward in pursuit and followed the enemy to the Rapidan, over which he passed with his rearguard by ten o'clock in the morning.

The behavior of Gen. Banks' corps during the action was very fine. No greater gallantry and daring could be exhibited by any troops. I cannot speak too highly of the coolness and intrepidity of Gen. Banks himself during the whole of the engagement. He was in the front and exposed as much as any man in his command. His example was of the greatest benefit to his troops, and he merits and should receive the commendation of his Government. Generals Williams, Augur, Gordon, Crawford, Prince, Green and Geary, behaved with conspicuous gallantry. Augur and Geary were severely wounded, and Prince, by losing his way in the dark while passing from one flank to another, fell into the hands of the enemy.

I desire publicly to express my appreciation of the prompt and skillful manner in which Generals McDowell and Sigel brought forward their respective commands, and established them on the field, and of their cheerful and hearty co-operation with me from beginning to end.

Brig. Gen. Roberts, Chief of Cavalry of this army, was with the advance of our forces on Friday and Saturday, and was conspicuous for his gallantry and for the valuable aid he rendered to Gens. Banks and Crawford.

Our loss was about 1,500 killed, wounded, and missing, of whom 290 were taken prisoners. As might be expected, from the character of the engagement, a very large proportion of these were killed. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, we are now satisfied, is much in excess of our own.

A full list of casualties will be transmitted as soon as possible, together with a detailed report, in which I shall endeavor to do justice to all.

JOHN POPE,
Major-General Commanding.

General Orders.

An inquiry has been very general among the troops of this command for the famous General order No. 11, current series of this Department. We reprint it for the gratification of all concerned, merely adding that it is in full force and effect. True, the Northern newspapers published what purported to be a disavowal of the President of the United States of Gen. Hunter's action in this particular matter, but we learn that no official notification of that disavowal has been received.

HEAD QUARTERS:—DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH.

Hilton Head, South Carolina, May 9, 1862.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 11.]

The three States of Georgia, Florida and South Carolina, comprising the Military Department of the South, having deliberately declared themselves no longer under the protection of the United States of America, and having taken up arms against said United States, it became a military necessity to declare Martial Law. This was accordingly done on the 25th day of April, 1862. Slavery and Martial Law, in a free country, are altogether incompatible; the persons in these three States, Georgia, Florida and South Carolina heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free.

DAVID HUNTER, Major General Commanding.

HEAD QUARTERS:—DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH.

Hilton Head, Port Royal, S. C., Aug. 15, 1862.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 26.]

The Major General Commanding desires to call the attention of all Regimental Infantry officers in this Department, to the paramount importance of familiarizing their commands with the manual of the Bayonet. Our soldiers should be instructed, to regard the proper use of this weapon as their greatest assurance of safety and most certain means of success in every struggle. The bayonet should be constantly placed before them as the decisive weapon of every battle;—not merely as a useful accessory or means of support to artillery, musketry and the sabres of Cavalry, but as the chief and final arm of the service, to which all others are subordinate. They should be taught that on the battle field, whilst irresolution or inactivity will expose them to decimation by repeated volleys from the rifles and other fire-arms of the enemy, a vigorous charge, promptly executed and in good order, will expose them to but one volley, with immediate victory as its result. It is in bayonet-charges that the physical superiority and higher intelligence of our stalwart soldiers over the enemy can best make itself felt. They should be taught this truth,—that with bayonets properly handled by obedient regiments we are invincible; and their attention should be strongly drawn to this other fact, that bayonetteers, except in isolated cases, rarely come into actual collision,—the side possessing superior weight and discipline, and which rushes forward determined that nothing but death shall stop it, invariably breaking the morale of the enemy before reaching them, and even disordering the one volley which the foe may fire, or attempt to fire, before turning in flight. All portions of the Bayonet Exercise are important,—not that men in actual conflict can assume all the attitudes and perform all the motions prescribed in the manual; but because the familiarity with the weapon thus acquired, gives them confidence and mastery in its use. In such hours of drill as the climate will permit, regimental Infantry Officers will devote their utmost attention to this subject, and the proverbial truth will be impressed upon the men, in reference to the bayonet-charge, that "from the nettle Danger we pluck the flower Safety." In all reviews and inspections of Troops hereafter to be held, the Major General Commanding will scrutinize with special care the proficiency of all infantry regiments, and regiments serving as infantry, in the manual of the bayonet.

D. HUNTER, Major General Commanding.

—A dispatch to the Richmond Examiner, dated Mobile, Aug. 8, states that Baton Rouge, La., was attacked on the 6th inst., by a rebel force under John C. Breckinridge. The United States troops, commanded by Brig. Gen. Williams, were driven from the City, and their camp equipage and stores fell into the hands of the enemy. Gen. Williams is reported to have been killed in the engagement. It was hoped by the rebels that the ram Arkansas would have cooperated with them in the attack, but in consequence of her machinery having become permanently disabled, she was unable to take part in the affair, and was subsequently blown up by her crew. Breckinridge, without her support, was compelled to retire from the City as it would have been impossible to hold his position in face of our gun-boats. Our readers will not lose sight of the fact that this report is from a rebel source.