T HE NE ? SOU T H. PORT ROYAL, SATURDAY, AUG. 28, 1802. OURSELVES. Tius Xkw South agaiu presents itself as a newspaper to the people of this Department. Five months since the first number was issued, and the genuine favor with which it was received gave ample encouragement for continuing the enterprise. But scarcely had the second issue t . - i i_ i i_ ... i: passed inco me nanus 01 us readers, wnen ra?ileal ami important changes occurred in the military government. All the resources of the printing otKco?then less extensive than now? were needed by (ien. Hunter in the organ iAition of the forces of his command. Of course private interests were cheerfully made secondary to the military emergency, and the publication of The New South was temporarily suspended. Not many days afterwards, Mr. Kadcau, the editor, was unexpectedly called to another field of usefulness; and the proprietor, having more urtrent claims upon his attention. could not conveniently carry on the publication until the present time. Now, with an excellent new press and enlarged printing facilities, he resumes the enterprise, confident that its prosperous career will not l?e again interrupted. The platform of The New South will not be changed a single plank from that announced in its 44 inaugural.'' The principles there set forth it will advocate persistently, conscientiously and to the best of its ability. We reprint these salutatory words,?only adding that cordial support and friendly countenance are asked of all who can" endorse our position as thus defiucd:? " Not of ten lias a newspaper occupied so singular a position as that filled to-day by The New South. Issued in a military command, addressed mostly to soldiers at the seat ol war, its audi _ ence is yet. y?t purely military, hut in part naval, itfpart civiH it is possible that some portion may !?? found at the North, it is not impossible that we may occasionally reach the car of Southerners, debarred now for more than a year from learning what the sentiments and intentions and power of the nation really are. In acting as spokesman both to and for this varied population we shall have several aims in view; first of all to support, as far as we are able, the national government. In order to do this more effectually we shall abstain from the discussion of exciting political topics, believing that the business of our most immediate readers is now military, not political, and that it is the province of the true patriot at this juncture, to do nothing to divide the national forces, or to distract their energies from the one great object of us all, the suppression of the ltcbellion. Here is a common ground where all can meet, and on that we mean to plant ourselves. It shall be our endeavor to strengthen the hands ot the government and those who represent it, to incite the courage and fortify the endurance of its defenders, not to sow the seeds of discord among those who are themselves battling against the results of discord. Next we desire to furnish news of interest and importance fc to our readers : for the life and basis of a newspaper are its reliability in this regard. Information concerning public matters at the North, the move_ luents of the national armies and affairs abroad, will be presented, in a condensed form, it is true, but still we trust a correct view of all important affairs will be afforded. The doings within this military command will of course receive a due A share of attention. None of the posts occupied l?v mir forces will be neglected, and itroeeedintrs W oi* every nature fit for publication will be chronicled ; but our loyal readers will not complain if we withhold any thing that could by any chance prove of service to the enemy. The news of the fleet, however, the daily life in camp, the health of the command, and a thousand other details will at once suggest themselves as proper subjects for rej>ort. These matters it is hoped, will prove of sufficient interest to the country at large for us to rely on a support from other quarters not altogether insignificant. And if an occasional copy of a Union paper should find its way to the deluded and unfortunate people with whom we are contending, some idea of the hopelessness of their effort may be afforded them. When they discover that the Unionists are so firmly established here as to issue and support _1 newspajiers, thoy will admit that we have no idea i | of returning ; they will conclude that our oecupa- 1 tion is not purely a military one; they will perhaps see how desperate is their own condition, and ; j submit more readily to the government which has j i never wished to do more than bring them back to | th ir allegiance, but which is determined to do that at every costf and at every hazard, and it' need t ! arises bv the en^lovment of everv means. i . A ? , 1 i The Department of Experiments. Under present eireumstances it may not be | inappropriate to pass briefly in review the vari- 1 | ous events which have oeeurred in this Pepart; ment, and to speak of tliem in their relations to : the great struggle for national existence in 1 which we are now engaged. It may with truth ]... ^-ilil fi.w it a 11 v nt the 'Teat results ' M\ CUMl %**W? ?\ *? y at * v. which sanguine journalists anticipated would i 1 follow the occupation of these sea islands, have 1 ! been achieved :^!>ut, with equal truth it may lie 1 said, that, taking into view the original object 1 of the expedition, and considering the resources : at its disposal, more has been accomplished than could, by any right, have been expected. The expedition under Gen. Sherman, was ( never designed to be the nucleus of an arinv of ' ... . i invasion. It simply was intended to co-operate 1 with the naval forces under Admiral Dupont, in ? ! holding the islands surrounding Port Royal 1 : Harbor as secure places of anchorage and un- ' molested depots for the vessels of the South At- 1 lantie Blockading Squadron. At first it was ' contemplated that the military force should not * exceed 8000 men and a few batteries of living 1 | artillery,?sufficient to operate in the vicinity of 1 I Port Royal harbor. Subsequently additions 1 were made to the original plan, looking to the 1 occupation of Fernaudina, St Augustine, Jack- 1 I sonville, and other points along the coast, and | 1 a greatlv increased force was assigned to Gen. 11 : Sherman's command; but the object of the ex- 1 pedition was never changed. The Government ' ' only desired stfTb havens and depots for its war i | vessels, and the collateral advantage of employ- * i ing a large force of the eneniv to observe and 1 . " i 1 I lire vent irruptions from our different small posts 1 along the coast line. So much in reply to the ' j absurd complaints that this Department has not ! realized the just expectations of the country. i But we claim for the Department of the South j an importance second to none for the influence j it has had upon the public mind and upon the j I general conduct of the war. Eminently, it has J been the great experimental department of the country, and upon its stage have been advanced : ideas which, more than any others, havefontri-; buted to mould public opinion in reference to our national struggle and the wisest mode of j conducting it. '1 The first experiment clearly developed tinadvantages of jtriiit land and naval operations. I The Navy took the Port Royal forts, opening the way for the army, and the latter repaid the j i favor by giving undisturbed security to the 11a- j val anchorage. But there were other and 1 greater advantages growing out of the success of this experiment. The spirits of the people of the North which had been drooping for months under the weight of continued reverses to our; 1 cause, were now enlivened by the sound of the j 1 first piean of victory coining from South Car-! olina, assuring them that whatever might be the fate of our armies in the conflict, the supremacy , of our sway over the waters of the South was nlaced beyond dispute. From this time dated ' .4 - ? J a new era of activity in the. Navy Department, j Every dockyard felt the impetus imparted by Ad- 1 iniral Dupont's success, in the energetic prepara- ! j tions made by the nation to avail itself to the ; t uttermost of the advantages offered by the naval J supremacy. The second experiment liegan in Gen. Slier- 1 nan's inaugural proclamation, where an attempt ivas made to conciliate the stiff-necked Palmetto generation and win tlietn hack to their allegiance iy reminiscences of the happy years they had lived under the protection of the llag which now hey sought to displace. To these honeyed vords the "chivalrous and hospitable people of he sovereign State of South Carolina," would scarcely deign to listen. It is certain that the .'Xperiinent of conciliation jiroved a signal failire. We do not join in the clamor raised against Jen. Sherman for the inactivity which followed he non-success of his pr 1:111 iam.Mito. ()n the ontrary, considering the force at his connnaml, ic did all that couhl rightfully have been e\pcc-^^^^H| All, mm ill H ill [ >l I W I *ru uiuir mall n natch within his reach. lie broke his force a desire to occupy >ossihlr point whereon lie could get a ind no beneficial result of lasting good ef this Department was the reduction of Fort l'uaski. It was there first demonstrated that rifled 1 irojectiles have an absolute domination over mamiry fortifications ; and from that boinbardir lit nust date a new era in the art of attacking and lefending fortified places. It may not be ^enTally known that the work of reducing Fort ,'ulaski from Tybee Island was undertaken by jell, (iillrnore in the face of dissuasion from the nost eminent military authorities. The attempt o breach a pile ?>f masonry from batteries of arthworks was regarded as impossible. But he shot which tore into ruin and pulverized ino dust the walls of Pulaski, overthrew much noro than brick, stone and mortar, and upset nam theories of infinitely heavier calibre than my metal used in the works upon C'ockspur island. The lesson taught by Tottleben in the lefenee of Sebastopol,uf the. value